Politically Connected Boards of Directors and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts

By Eitan Moshe Goldman, Jörg Rocholl, Jongil So. 2013

777 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7224fb1c2d10259ac4be0b1d48424484ac15468f

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Citations in the corpus

Board Expertise: Do Directors from Related Industries Help Bridge the Information Gap? (2014, neutral): “…advice and shows, for instance, that directors are particularly sought for advice when the firm is complex or when they can provide contacts, financial expertise, and political influence (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2008; Güner, Malmendier, and Tate 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, and So 2009, 2013).”
Accrual-based and real earnings management and political connections (2015, background): “…get easier access to debt financing and lower taxation (e.g. Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010; Goldman et al., 2013), have preferential access to government contracts (Goldman et al., 2009), or have benefits from regulatory protection (Kroszner…”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, neutral): “However, Goldman et al. (2013) find that political connections can increase the value of the procurement contracts of U.S. public firms, suggesting that connected firms worry less about losing government contracts.4 Therefore, politically connected firms can potentially afford more aggressive tax…”
Customer Concentration Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital (2016, background): “Unlike corporate customers, however, federal government customers are much less likely to default or declare bankruptcy, and government purchases are typically regulated by longer-term procurement contracts (Goldman et al., 2013), which reduce the risk that government customers will switch suppliers”
The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying (2016, neutral): “Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on political connections (Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Faccio (2006), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), and Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009, 2013)).”