Corporate Political Contributions and Stock Returns

By Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen, Alexei V. Ovtchinnikov. 2010

794 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0a0cf4ec9f444e296f0374125624d5a444456ca9

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate donations and shareholder value (2017, neutral): “…with the value-enhancement theory, showing a negative effect on firm value when politicians tied to the firm lose power and a positive effect when the connected politicians get elected (Faccio & Parsley, 2009; Jayachandran, 2006; Cooper, Gulen & Ovtchinnikov, 2010; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009).”
CAN LOWER TAX RATES BE BOUGHT? BUSINESS RENT-SEEKING AND TAX COMPETITION AMONG U.S. STATES (2009, result): “Recent results by Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2009) favor the investment view; they find a large positive impact of mutually-exclusive, to this “Tullock Puzzle” (1972).”
Does Political Corruption Impede Firm Innovation? Evidence from the United States (2019, background): “Many studies examine the value impact of so-called “legal corruption,” including corporate lobbying (Yu and Yu (2011), Blau, Brough, and Thomas (2013), Borisov et al. (2015), and Kang (2016)) and campaign contributions (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010), Akey (2015)).”
Political Geography and Stock Returns: The Value and Risk Implications of Proximity to Political Power (2012, neutral): “…such as adding politicians to their board of directors (Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2008, 2009), making significant political campaign contributions (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov, 2010, among others),9 or incurring significant lobbying expenditures (Hill, Kelly, and Van Ness, 2009, among…”
Why Do Countries Matter so Much in Corporate Social Performance (2016, positive): “Cooper et al. (2010) find that a portfolio of stocks of companies weighted by the number of candidates they have supported earned a 2.4% annual abnormal return.”
Government Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms (2013, neutral): “There is also an 6 But political connections have returns, as shown by Cooper et al. (2010) and Calomiris et al. (2010).”