The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms: How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value

By Mauricio Jara-Bertín, F. López-Iturriaga, Óscar López-de-Foronda. 2008

160 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2c57c6aaa60b1875edb5cb4bc6d194e3a1853051

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Giovanni Gavetti
2. William Ocasio
3. Daniel A. Levinthal
4. Henrich R. Greve
5. Philip Bromiley
6. Jared D. Harris

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

1. Giovanni Gavetti
2. Henrich R. Greve
3. William Ocasio
4. Daniel A. Levinthal
5. Teppo Felin
6. N. J. Foss
7. Claus Rerup
8. J. Eggers

In Strategy and Management

1. William Ocasio
2. Giovanni Gavetti
3. Henrich R. Greve
4. Daniel A. Levinthal
5. N. J. Foss
6. Teppo Felin
7. Kathleen M. Eisenhardt
8. Michael G. Jacobides

Citations in the corpus

• Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, unknown): “Consequently, as pointed out by Jensen (1986), managers are induced to use the firm’s free cash flow to finance negative net present value projects that only benefit themselves, which would be avoided if expensive external capital was needed.”
• Intra- and extra-bank determinants of Latin American Banks' profitability (2016, unknown): “Consequently, according to Jara, López, and López-de-Foronda (2008) the variables do not need to be transformed to stationary before estimating the model.”
• The Behavioral Theory of the Firm: Assessment and Prospects (2012, background): “Jara-Bertin, Lopez-Iturriaga, and Lopez-de-Foronda ( 2008 ) examine how shifting coalitions between family shareholders and outside investors shape performance of European family-owned firms.”