The influence of executive age, career horizon and incentives on pre-turnover earnings management

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How researchers see this paper

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Beyond gender diversity: How specific attributes of female directors affect earnings management (2017, result): “contradicts the study by Davidson et al. (2007) which asserts that CEOs near retirement are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation.”
When CEO Career Horizon Problems Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility: The Moderating Roles of Industry-Level Discretion and Blockholder Ownership (2016, methodology): “We used CEO age as a proxy for CEO’s career horizon that significantly affects his or her strategic decision-making patterns (Davidson et al. 2007; Gray and Cannella 1997).”
Female executives and earnings management (2010, methodology): “Following previous studies, we assess the extent of earnings management by estimating the discretionary accruals in reported earnings (see e.g. Becker et al., 1998; Xie et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Geiger and North, 2006; Davidson et al., 2007; Meek et al., 2007).”
The influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting: A review and outlook from the perspective of upper echelons theory (2016, background): “Studies of executive age show that older CEOs are less often involved in fraudulent actions (Troy et al., 2011) and have a higher tendency to manage earnings upward in the two years before their departure (Davidson et al., 2007).”