Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing network layer

By Michael J. Freedman, Robert Morris. 2002

823 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Privacy & Security

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Privacy & Security

Citations in the corpus

Prio: Private, Robust, and Scalable Computation of Aggregate Statistics (2017, background): “PrivStats [100] and ANONIZE [76] outsource to Tor [51] (or another low-latency anonymity system [61, 88,101]) the work of protecting privacy against a network adversary (Figure 10).”
Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, background): “Crowds [40], LAP [27], Mixminion [16], Tarzan [21], and Tor [18], provide anonymity in large networks, but these systems cannot protect against adversaries that observe traffic [4, 35] or perform active attacks [9] on a large fraction of network links.”
Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “Aqua [54], Crowds [72], LAP [49], ShadowWalker [60], Tarzan [32], and Tor [28] belong to the first category of systems: they provide an anonymous proxy for real-time Web browsing, but they do not protect against an adversary who controls the network, many of the clients, and some of the nodes on a v”
Practical Traffic Analysis: Extending and Resisting Statistical Disclosure (2004, background): “A sender who also runs a node in the mix network can conceal whether a given message originated at her node or was relayed from another node [5, 20, 29].”
Survey of research towards robust peer-to-peer networks: Search methods (2006, background): “Security Character [172-182] Identity Reputation and Trust Incentives Goals [25, 27, 71, 183-197] Availability Authenticity Anonymity Access Control Fair Trading”
Taxonomy of trust: Categorizing P2P reputation systems (2006, methodology): “A P2P-specific solution using anonymizing tunnels is Tarzan [25].”
Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor (2005, background): “Tor, on the other hand, like some other designs, most notably MorphMix [36] and Tarzan [21] [20], assumes a much weaker threat model.”
Eclipse Attacks on Overlay Networks: Threats and Defenses (2006, background): “Although there are many general-purpose anonymous channel mechanisms for overlay networks [13], [17], [27], [32], [45], the anonymity requirements of our auditing mechanism are weaker than those”
Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Mix Systems (Extended Abstract) (2004, background): “A number of low-latency mix-based protocols for unlinkable communications have been proposed, including ISDN-Mixes [14], Onion Routing [16], Tarzan [10], Web Mixes [3], and Freedom [2].”
Herbivore: A Scalable and Efficient Protocol for Anonymous Communication (2003, neutral): “Tarzan [7] uses a decentralized, peer-to-peer approach to construct such a series of mixes, called tunnels.”
Eluding carnivores: file sharing with strong anonymity (2004, background): “In source-rewriting systems [2, 12, 8, 11, 5, 4, 6], messages are sent through the network via random paths to obfuscate their origin.”
Timing Analysis in Low-Latency Mix Networks: Attacks and Defenses (2006, background): “Many different architectures for mix networks have been proposed in literature [3,13,9,18,11].”
Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things (2017, background): “Distributed anonymity systems can overcome this drawback, such as Crowds [126], onion routing [76], Tarzan [69], and Tor [60].”
Towards efficient traffic-analysis resistant anonymity networks (2013, background): “Roughly a decade ago, a number of researchers proposed designs for low-latency, traﬃc-analysis resistant anonymity networks [4, 8, 12, 17, 18, 26, 28].”
Compromising Electromagnetic Emanations of Wired and Wireless Keyboards (2009, methodology): “Hence, we used a cheaper and open-source solution based on the USRP (Universal Software Radio Peripheral) [14] and the GNU Radio project [35].”
Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer Distributed Hash Tables (2002, methodology): “For example, the Tarzan anonymizing network [2] proposes the use of Chord as a way of discovering random nodes to use in dy-”