Herbivore: A Scalable and Efficient Protocol for Anonymous Communication
By Sharad Goel, Mark E. Robson, Milo Polte, Emin Gün Sirer. 2003
219 citations recorded by the source corpus.
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Eleftherios Kokoris-Kogias
- Ewa Syta
- Dan Boneh
- Philipp Jovanovic
- Bryan Ford
- Linus Gasser
- Nicolas Gailly
- Emin Gün Sirer
Citations in the corpus
- Proactively Accountable Anonymous Messaging in Verdict (2012, background): “Dining cryptographers networks [13] (DC-nets) promise security even against traffic analysis attacks, and recent systems such as Herbivore [24, 44] and Dissent [14, 52] have improved the scalability of DC-netstyle systems.”
- Riposte: An Anonymous Messaging System Handling Millions of Users (2015, background): “Herbivore scales DC-nets by dividing users into many small anonymity sets [38].”
- Vuvuzela: scalable private messaging resistant to traffic analysis (2015, unknown): “Herbivore [21] and Dissent [36] form broadcast groups of up to 5,000 users each, which limits each user’s anonymity and requires significant overhead to be used for point-to-point communication (as each message is broadcast to all users in its group).”
- KARMA : A Secure Economic Framework for Peer-to-Peer Resource Sharing (2003, background): “A cryptographic puzzle [5] ensures that the assignment is random, and limits the rate at which a given node can join the system.”
- Dissent in Numbers: Making Strong Anonymity Scale (2012, unknown): “way to serve very large networks would be to adopt a technique introduced by Herbivore [35]: break the overall network into smaller parallel Dissent groups—with tens of”
- Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router (2004, unknown): “Herbivore [25] andP(5) [46] go even further, requiring broadcast.”
- Scalable Bias-Resistant Distributed Randomness (2017, background): “Anytrustbased systems, such as Herbivore [32], Dissent [60], and Vuvuzela [59], as well as sharded blockchains [23], use biasresistant public randomness for scalability by sharding participants into smaller groups.”
- A Survey of Solutions to the Sybil Attack (2006, background): “• Resource testing [4, 15,19,33,38,41,51,55,56,59,61,67,87,93,95] The goal of resource testing is to attempt to determine if a number of identities possess fewer resources than would be expected if they were independent.”