Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer Distributed Hash Tables

By Emil Sit, Robert Morris. International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems, 2002

489 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b8ea048b109fe7c05a43c78ad1760ce41e7992ea

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

1. Prateek Mittal
2. Nikita Borisov
3. Jon Crowcroft
4. Marcelo R. Pias
5. Sharon Goldberg
6. Peter Druschel
7. Aviv Zohar
8. John Risson

In Computer Networks and Communications

1. Prateek Mittal
2. Nikita Borisov
3. D. Wallach
4. John Risson
5. Tim Moors
6. Ling Liu
7. Atul Singh
8. Jon Crowcroft

Citations in the corpus

• ShadowWalker: peer-to-peer anonymous communication using redundant structured topologies (2009, background): “By default, DHTs are extremely vulnerable to attacks on the lookup mechanism [43, 48].”
• A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Security Issues (2002, background): “Making these systems “secure” is a significant challenge [5, 6].”
• TrustMe: anonymous management of trust relationships in decentralized P2P systems (2003, background): “They propose a simplistic underlying protocol based on a DHT based mechanism like CAN [11] or Chord [13].”
• Survey of research towards robust peer-to-peer networks: Search methods (2006, background): “It has potential to evolve better from small configurations—the capital outlays for high performance servers can be reduced and spread over time if a P2P assembly of general purpose nodes is used.”
• A survey and comparison of peer-to-peer overlay network schemes (2005, background): “If FIND NODE fails to return a peer that is any closer,”
• Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin's Peer-to-Peer Network (2015, background): “There has been extensive research on eclipse attacks [27, 61, 62] in structured p2p networks built upon distributed hash tables (DHTs); see [64] for a survey.”
• Eclipse Attacks on Overlay Networks: Threats and Defenses (2006, background): “In an Eclipse attack [5], [37], a modest number of malicious nodes conspire to fool correct nodes into adopting the malicious nodes as their peers, with the goal of dominating the neighbor sets of all correct nodes.”