The Effect of 10K Restatements on Firm Value, Information Asymmetries, and Investors' Reliance on Earnings

By Kirsten L. Anderson, Teri Lombardi Yohn. 2002

237 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/21293814ef142a8dd04ab98c9c3bf70de2abb843

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements (2006, unknown): “Similar results are reported by Anderson and Yohn (2002), Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2003), Wu (2002) and Hribar and Jenkins (2004).”
The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior (2012, unknown): “4 First, our study shows that ﬁrm-initiated clawback provisions mitigate the likelihood of ﬁnancial misstate-ments and their negative impacts as documented in many previous studies (e.g., Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004; Palmrose et al., 2004; Wilson, 2008).”
Revenue Manipulation and Restatements by Loss Firms (2008, background): “…manipulation is often more costly than expense manipulation since the average decrease in market value once the manipulation is discovered is much higher if the manipulation involves revenues rather than expenses (see Callen et al. (2002), Anderson and Yohn (2002), and Palmrose et al. (2004),).”
Enterprise Risk Management Program Quality: Determinants, Value Relevance, and the Financial Crisis (2013, unknown): “Anderson and Yohn (2002) find weaker response to earnings surprises following restatements, and Francis, Schipper, and Vincent (2002) show that the increase in earnings response over two decades is largely due to better disclosure of the properties of earnings, implying that nonfinancial disclosures”
The financial expertise of CFOs and accounting restatements (2005, background): “Anderson and Yohn (2002) also find that investors and dealers react negatively (lower market returns and increased bid-ask spreads) to restatements.”
Cooking the books : recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China (2011, unknown): “…earnings, ability of earnings to predict future cash flows, and the conservative recognition of earnings. j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / j c o r p f i n (e.g., Anderson and Yohn, 2002; Hennes et al., 2008; Palmrose et al., 2004; Plumlee and Yohn, 2009).”
The Effect of Accounting Restatements on Earnings Revisions and the Estimated Cost of Capital (2004, unknown): “Palmrose et al. (2004) and Anderson and Yohn (2002) identify determinants of the market’s reaction to restatement announcements.”
Managerial Ability and Earnings Quality (2013, background): “The Accounting Review March 2013 We consider four measures of earnings quality: the existence of an earnings restatement (Anderson and Yohn 2002), the persistence of earnings (Richardson et al. 2005), errors in the bad debt provision (McNichols and Wilson 1988), and the extent to which accruals map…”
Corporate Governance and Firm Value: the Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules (2007, result): “Consistent with these findings, Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find that firms’ cost of capital increases after restatements, and Anderson and Yohn (2002) find that the bid-ask spread of firms increases after financial restatements.9 9 Another approach is to group firms into portfolios according to how…”
The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover (2004, unknown): “Similar results are reported by Anderson and Yohn (2002), Richardson et al. (2003), Wu (2002), and Hribar and Jenkins (2004).”
The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders (2009, background): “Dechow et al. (1996), Anderson and Yohn (2002), and Palmrose et al. (2004) document significant negative returns following financial restatements and ascribe part of the losses to uncertainty about managerial competence and integrity (agency costs), and overall disclosure quality (information risk).”
What Do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their Trading (2010, background): “However, we know that the majority of earning restatement led to a negative stock market reaction, consistent with a negative adjustment to earnings; furthermore, when the restatement is due to revenue recognition it generates the most negative market reaction (Anderson and Lombardi Yohn, 2002).”
Accruals Quality and Internal Control over Financial Reporting (2007, background): “Although our focus is on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure, which we feel is both theoretically and intuitively appealing, we also consider other common proxies for accruals quality: discretionary accruals (Jones 1991), average accruals quality (Dechow and Dichev 2002), historical restatements ( ”