Cooking the books : recipes and costs of falsified financial statements in China

By Michael Firth, Oliver M. Rui, Wenfeng Wu. 2011

221 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/76fd68e53b759f82876fc3c33259d2ce077b8aca

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Sofia Johan
2. Wenfeng Wu
3. Wenxuan Hou
4. Kam C. Chan
5. G. Moore
6. Oliver M. Rui
7. Qinyuan Chen
8. Nianhang Xu

In Finance

1. Sofia Johan
2. Wenxuan Hou
3. G. Moore
4. Wenfeng Wu
5. Oliver M. Rui
6. Qinyuan Chen
7. Kam C. Chan
8. Nianhang Xu

Citations in the corpus

• Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, unknown): “Other studies analyzing the determinants of corporate fraud have highlighted the importance of corporate oversight and ownership (Chen et al. 2006; Hou and Moore 2010; Firth et al. 2011).”
• Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, unknown): “Fifth, we include leverage, receivables, inventory, and intangibles (Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2006; Firth, Rui, and Wu, 2011; Armstrong et al., 2013).”
• Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, background): “In addition, the literature suggests that political connections are critical for a firm to benefit from favorable decisions in corporate litigation (Firth et al., 2011), the approval and promotion of initial public offerings (Liu et al., 2013; Piotroski and Zhang, 2014), and family firm success (Xu…”
• Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China (2014, unknown): “However, prior research has shown that firms that commit fraud are also more likely to fire their CEOs (Chen et al. 2005; Firth et al. 2011).”
• Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud (2014, methodology): “Following previous studies, we use the widely accepted market development index compiled by Fan et al. (2010) to capture the regional differences between institutions in China (Firth et al. 2011).”
• Player and Referee Roles Held Jointly: The Effect of State Ownership on China’s Regulatory Enforcement Against Fraud (2010, background): “Evidence of emerging stock markets from Chen et al. (2006) and Firth et al. (2010) shows that outside directors and directors with an accounting or financial background help to reduce the fraudulent practice of Chinese listed firms.”