The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior
By Lilian H. Chan, Kevin C. W. Chen, Tai-Yuan Chen, Yangxin Yu. 2012
206 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/33a113c55508eed0d773801b345426afea837e60
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In Accounting
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Bank Loan Contracting (2013, methodology): “Consistent with this view, Chan et al. (2012b) find that clawback adopting firms switch from using abnormal accruals to cutting discretionary expenses to avoid missing earnings benchmarks, with total earnings management not decreasing subsequent to clawbacks.”
- Substitution between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management after Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions (2015, unknown): “While financial media raise questions about the effectiveness of firm-initiated clawbacks (e.g., Dvorak and Ng 2006; Weiss 2008; Lublin 2010), Chan et al. (2012) and DeHaan et al. (2013) find that after clawback adoption, financial misstatements decrease and investors consider earnings to be more…”
- Does Voluntary Adoption of a Clawback Provision Improve Financial Reporting Quality (2013, unknown): “Ed deHaan August 2023 Page 1 Ed deHaan edehaan@stanford.edu • gsb-faculty.stanford.edu/ed-dehaan/”