Revenue Manipulation and Restatements by Loss Firms

By Jeffrey L. Callen, Sean W. G. Robb, D. Segal. 2008

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Accounting complexity, misreporting, and the consequences of misreporting (2012, methodology): “H1, the null hypothesis of no result could occur if the effect of complexity on revenue misreporting were small or if misreporting is solely driven by managerial incentives and governance, as hypothesized in prior literature (Palmrose et al. 2004; Burns and Kedia 2006; Zhang 2006; Callen et al. 200”
Discretionary Revenues as a Measure of Earnings Management (2010, methodology): “I use the implementation of the Petersen and Rajan (1997) credit policy model described in Callen et al. (2008). A firm’s investment in receivables is a function of its financial strength, operational performance relative to industry competitors, and stage in the business cycle.”
Abnormal Audit Fees and Restatements (2012, background): “For example, various empirical studies have investigated the influence of earnings management (Ettredge et al. 2010; Callan et al. 2008; Choi et al. 2010), CEO compensation (Efendi et al.”
Evolution in Value Relevance of Accounting Information (2019, unknown): “Collins et al. (1997) documents that special items have increased, and suggests this increase could reduce the value relevance of earnings.”