Corporate Governance and Firm Value: the Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules

By Vidhi Chhaochharia, Yaniv Grinstein. 2007

769 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4de1aeda171bbb713b47a9eda5c1c03673e21dad

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Citations in the corpus

Does corporate governance affect Australian banks' performance? (2016, background): “Several other studies also indicate that the SOX regulations had positive impact on firm value in the US (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Linck et al., 2009).”
Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really this Costly? A Discussion of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions (2007, neutral): “12 This is in essence the identification approach in Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) and Hochberg et al.”
Corporate Governance and Firm Value: International Evidence (2011, positive): “Hence, the valuation effect of corporate governance in our sample is comparable to that reported in Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009). Regarding the control variables, our findings largely correspond to those of Aggarwal et al.”
Executive Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation (2012, positive): “Chhaochharia and Grinstein(2007) show that, among firms impacted by SOX, large firms increased in value but small firms at U niversity of N orth C arolina at C hapel H ill on M ay 20, 2013 http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/ D ow nloaded from decreased in value, relative to a control group.”
Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance (2013, background): “9 As noted in Grinstein and Chhaochharia (2009), IRRC use a more stringent definition of independence to classify directors than what is used under stock exchange listing rules.”
Director Ownership, Governance, and Performance (2013, positive): “Finally, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that firms that were less compliant with the rules imposed by SOX and the exchanges earned positive abnormal returns on the announcement of the rules, relative to firms that were more compliant.”
Risky Lending: Does Bank Corporate Governance Matter? (2017, positive): “…declined from 80% in 1999 to 74% in 2004 and the fraction with classified boards declined from 62% to 45% during the same period.3 We use the evidence from Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007a) and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007b) as well as the trends observed above to create our instrument.”
The Changing of the Boards: The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation (2012, neutral): “Other papers examine the effect of regulatory changes to boards due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010), the Cadbury Committee Report in the UK (Dahya and McConnell, 2007), and the 1976 German codetermination law (Petry, 2009).”
Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (2007, positive): “This evidence, in line with previous studies (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2005) suggests that only large companies can effectively bear the cost of a strong corporate governance regime, while for smaller companies it can be “too much of a good thing”.”
Bundles of Firm Corporate Governance Practices: A Fuzzy Set Analysis (2013, neutral): “Recent studies also find that the introduction of new CG regulations such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US can be counterproductive for some companies’ valuation (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007; Wintoki, 2007).”