Board Composition: Balancing Family Influence in S&P 500 Firms

By Ronald C. Anderson, David M. Reeb. 2004

1,269 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1f59471af2a00242d97926ec4734c81794cf5a7b

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Organizational Characteristics on the Appointment of Nonfamily Managers in Private Family Firms (2015, background): “…De Castro, 2012; Gersick et al., 1997), strategic choices such as diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), acquisition behavior (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010), R&D investments (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), and organizational governance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Voordeckers et al., 2007).”
Organisational determinants of information technology adoption and implementation in SMEs: The case of family and cooperative firms (2007, background): “Among these, we should mention two processes that are occasionally directly associated with growth: the professionalisation processes (Anderson and Reeb, 2004) of the management in family SMEs and the implementation of total quality systems.”
Does founding family control affect earnings management? (2009, result): “Our results are broadly consistent with those of Anderson and Reeb ( 2003a , b , 2004 ) and Anderson et al .”
Family‐Owned Business Succession: The Influence of Pre‐performance in the Nomination of Family and Nonfamily Members: Evidence from Spanish Firms (2010, methodology): “This evidence is in accordance with the results obtained by Anderson and Reeb (2004), where they suggest that family members prefer to limit independent director presence on the board.”
Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms (2010, background): “In large US firms, controlling families’ tendency to expropriate minority shareholders may be constrained by independent directors whose power is supported by the legal and regulatory frameworks (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), whereas in large Korean firms, this might be difficult.”
National Governance System, Corporate Ownership, and Roles of Outside Directors: A Corporate Governance Bundle Perspective (2014, neutral): “The concentrated family equity holdings result in a relative lack of financial portfolio diversification and limited liquidity (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), making resources available to family owners limited as compared to other blockholders such as the state and the institutional investors.”
An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities (2008, positive): “Previous studies suggest that family owners may have superior monitoring abilities relative to diffused shareholders, especially when family ownership is combined with family control over management and the board of the firm (Anderson and Reeb 2004).”
Family Firm Research – A Review (2014, positive): “Anderson and Reeb (2004) find that family firms perform best when the power of the founding family is balanced by the presence of independent directors.”
The Resilient Family Firm: Stakeholder Outcomes and Institutional Effects (2015, background): “…arrangements such as the involvement of the family in management (Villalonga & Amit, 2006), the structure and composition of the board of directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), compensation arrangements (Gómez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003), and how the balances of agency costs and benefits…”