Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind."

By Alan M. Leslie. 1987

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Citations in the corpus

Machine Theory of Mind (2018, background): “Humans recognise that other agents do not base their decisions directly on the state of the world, but rather on an internal representation, or belief about the state of the world (Leslie, 1987; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman, 1992).”
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? (2009, background): “Human infants and nonhuman animals”
Gaze Cueing of Attention (2007, background): “That is, the eyes can help children detect deception—another vital step in the development of theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1992; Leslie, 1987).”
Sampling the form of inner experience in three adults with Asperger syndrome (1994, background): “Recent research has provided evidence for a specific and unique impairment in the ability of autistic subjects to attribute mental states-a lack of 'theory of mind' (BaronCohen et al. 1985; Leslie, 1987; Frith, 1989; Perner et al. 1989).”
Imaging the Intentional Stance in a Competitive Game (2002, background): “Leslie (1987, 1994) suggests that the mentalizing mechanism depends upon a representation of imaginary circumstances " decoupled " from reality.”
A THEORY OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY: NECESSARY COMPONENTS AND DISORDERS RESULTING FROM THEIR LOSS (2004, methodology): “For example, research on theory of mind reframed the ability to " reflect upon the self " as the ability to form metarepresentations, which are representations about other mental representations, whether one's own or others' (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; German & Leslie, 2000; Leslie, 1987).”
On the distinction between rationality and intelligence: Implications for understanding individual differences in reasoning. (2012, background): “In a much-cited article, Leslie (1987) modeled pretense by positing a so-called secondary representation (see Perner, 1991) that was a copy of the primary representation but that was decoupled from the world so that it could be manipulated—that is, be a mechanism for simulation.”
The complexity of developmental predictions from dual process models (2011, background): “In a much-cited article, Leslie (1987) modeled pretense by positing a so-called secondary representation (see Perner, 1991) that was a copy of the primary representation but that was decoupled from the world so that it could be manipulated—that is, be a mechanism for simulation.”
Theory of mind and autism: A review (2000, background): “For example, it might reflect a failure to reflect on one’s own imagination - a mindreading deficit (Leslie, 1987).”
To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind (2014, background): “…& Geraci, 2012), and there are many who argue that an understanding of mental states is innate (BaronCohen, 1997; Legerstee, Barna, & DiAdamo, 2000; Leslie, 1987; Premack, 1990; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009), or develops in the first few months of life (Luo, 2011b; Sodian, 2011; Vaish & Woodward,…”
Why the Child's Theory of Mind Really Is a Theory (1992, background): “There is evidence that children actually have such fictional mental states as young as 18 months (e.g. Leslie, 1987).”
An investigation of pretend play, mental state terms and false belief understanding: In search of a metarepresentational link (2000, methodology): “Leslie (1987, 1988) has proposed that it is through the ability to appreciate dual representations, !rst evident in pretence, that the pre-school child begins to relate metarepresentational expressions to the language of thought, and hence construct a mental state lexicon.”