Compensation and Organizational Performance: Theory, Research, and Practice

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Human Capital and CEO Compensation during Institutional Transitions (2015, unknown): “In comparison to the voluminous literature on CEO compensation in developed economies (Devers et al., 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Tosi et al., 2000; Van Essen et al., 2012a, 2014), the literature on CEO compensation in the world’s second largest economy is sparse (Sun e”
Executive stock options as mixed gambles: Revisiting the behavioral agency model (2013, unknown): “price are positively related to the value of those options (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).”
Signaling in Secret: Pay-for-Performance and the Incentive and Sorting Effects of Pay Secrecy (2014, background): “suggests that PFP generally signals managerial intentions to better reward higher-performing employees, and thus serves as a useful means by which to increase the likelihood of their attraction and retention (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).”
Board Interlocks and Firm Performance: Toward a Combined Agency–Resource Dependence Perspective (2018, background): “In Italy, unlike the United States, where CEO equity ownership and stock options are almost universal among the largest firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), stock options are rarely granted, and the distribution of equity ownership across managers of corporations is closer to a binomial distribution.”