Comparing alternative explanations for accounting risk-return relations

By David L. Deephouse, Robert M. Wiseman. 2000

111 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/148d63fb872e0d9b1179d831451b08bbc589a6f7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Relative Strategic Emphasis and Firm-Idiosyncratic Risk: The Moderating Role of Relative Performance and Demand Instability (2017, background): “A differential focus on the upside or downside associated with demand instability may affect managerial decisions among executives (Deephouse and Wiseman 2000).”
Incentives to Cheat: The Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation (2007, background): “Others create one aspiration variable that equals the self reference point if a firm is above the social comparison level, and the social comparison level if the firm is below the social comparison level (Bromiley, 1991; Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1996; Wiseman & Catanach, 1997).”
Organizational Aspirations, Reference Points, and Goals (2012, methodology): “Third, Deephouse and Wiseman (2000) find firms in turbulent environmental conditions, with performance both above and below aspirations, exhibit similar risk-taking behaviors.”
Slack Resources and the Performance of Privately Held Firms (2005, unknown): “Some studies of slack have combined behavioral and agency theory explanations of risk taking in publicly held firms (Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000).”
Employee Incentives to Make Firm-Specific Investments: Implications for Resource-Based Theories of Corporate Diversification (2006, background): “…in the strategic management literature indeed suggest that diverse stakeholders, including a firm’s employees, suppliers, and customers, often demand compensation for risk bearing (Aaker & Jacobson, 1990; Amit & Wernerfelt, 1990; Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Miller, 1998; Miller & Chen, 2003).”
A comparison of alternative measures of organizational aspirations (2014, background): “Bromiley (1991) offers a model with a single aspiration level that systematically switches from one referent to the other (see also Deephouse and Wiseman, 2000; Park, 2007; Wiseman and Bromiley, 1996).”
A review of research on the negative accounting relationship between risk and return: Bowman's paradox (2002, methodology): “Deephouse and Wiseman [27] and Veliyath and Ferris [14] also employed the default risk argument as a theoretical background, 1nding a negative inMuence of risk on the latter return.”
Untangling the Effects of Overexploration and Overexploitation on Organizational Performance: The Moderating Role of Environmental Dynamism† (2008, methodology): “Also following previous research (e.g., Deephouse & Wiseman, 2000; Miller & Reuer, 1996), we used Altman’s Z score (Altman, 1968) as a measure of financial distress or distance from bankruptcy.”
Comparing Aspiration Models: The Role of Selective Attention (2010, unknown): “Several studies impose attention switching (Bromiley 1991, Palmer and Wiseman 1999, Deephouse and Wiseman 2000), implying that the way firms form aspirations varies with performance.”