Coping with corruption in foreign markets

By Jonathan P. Doh, Peter Rodriguez, Klaus Uhlenbruck, Jamie D. Collins, Lorraine Eden. 2003

353 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/12ae463d513c8a343918d602ff70f85898a3e792

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Citations in the corpus

The effect of institutional quality on firm export performance in emerging economies: a contingency model of firm age and size (2013, background): “The literature on corruption and anticorruption policies and their enforcement strongly supports this perspective (Doh et al. 2003).”
Does bribery in the home country promote or dampen firm exports (2013, background): “Given that the opportunities for misusing authority in pursuit of personal interests are abundant when legal and judicial systems are not fully developed, government corruption is particularly common in these countries (Doh et al., 2003; Lee, Oh, and Eden, 2010).”
Institutional exceptions on global projects: a process model (2008, background): “Types of Firm Decision Turning more briefly to the kinds of firm-level decision affected by institutional differences, we see studies on a wide range of behaviors, including: efforts to assess the stability of the policy environment (Henisz, Zelner, & Guillen, 2005); choice of country, sector, and l”
International business responses to institutional voids (2017, background): “Doh et al. (2003) documented the recursive relationship between social and economic underdevelopment and corruption, illustrating that institutional fragility begets economic and social indigence which, in turn, further erodes institutions.”
Multinationals' response to major disasters: how does subsidiary investment vary in response to the type of disaster and the quality of country governance? (2011, background): “, 1998; North, 1990), and corruption (Doh et al., 2003; Henisz and Williamson, 1999) affect firm location and entry mode decisions.”
Why Do Firms Bribe? (2010, background): “First, at the country level, the pervasiveness of public sector corruption is likely to affect each official’s assessment of the benefits and costs of demanding bribes (Doh et al., 2003).”
The MNC as an agent of change for host-country institutions: FDI and corruption (2006, background): “Demonstration effect In the international business literature, there is a line of research that studies spillover effects of foreign direct investment (Globerman (1979), Haddad and Harrison (1993), Eden et al.”
Home country uncertainty and the internationalization-performance relationship: Building an uncertainty management capability (2017, background): “We expected corruption to have negative effects on performance because it increases the cost of operation, distorts the allocation of resources, and increases uncertainty (Doh et al., 2003).”
The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do You Trust? (2013, background): “Further, extortion can be disguised as bribery when firms have to make payments to avoid bureaucratic delays (Doh et al., 2003) or comply with laws which were created with the purpose of creating bribery opportunities for the corrupt officials (Neilsen, 2003).”
Corruption, South African Multinational Enterprises and Institutions in Africa (2014, background): “From an organisational perspective, Doh et al. (2003) propose six types of direct costs that organisations incur as a result of corruption when operating in foreign countries.”
Corruption, Underdevelopment, and Extractive Resource Industries: Addressing the Vicious Cycle (2006, background): “Corruption is commonly defined as “the abuse of public power for private benefit” (Doh et al. 2003; Tanzi 1998), a definition adopted by the World Bank.”
The Impact of Corruption on Entry Strategy: Evidence from Telecommunication Projects in Emerging Economies (2006, background): “By exporting, or engaging in other arm’s-length transactions such as turnkey projects, MNEs reduce their direct exposure to corruption by using local firms as their agents (Doh et al. 2003).”
Private Provision of Infrastructure in Emerging Markets: Do Institutions Matter? (2006, background): “While there have been a significant number of studies examining the effect of one or two institutional variables (or categories of variables) on firms’ strategy (Doh et al., 2003; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003) or private sector development (Banerjee et al.”