When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods

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Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, unknown): “Joseph Henrich”
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field (2009, unknown): “As discussed by Carpenter (2004), the conformity preference could generate less cooperative outcomes than predicted by the model of pure self-interest; that is, subjects could conform to similarly high levels of extraction.”
Dual-inheritance theory: The evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution (2007, background): “Players in these games were willing to use conformist learning for acquiring cooperative behaviour, selfish behav iour. the costly pWlishment of non-cooperators, and even the costly punishment of those who refuse to punish non-cooperators (Carpenter, 2004; Denant-Boemont eta!”
Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature (2011, background): “Carpenter (2007a) approaches the issue of punishment effectiveness by asking what happens to monitoring of free riders and punishment as the group size becomes bigger.”
An Experimental Investigation of the Interactions among Intentions, Reciprocity, and Control (2013, background): “A variety of experimental studies have examined this type of learning (e.g., Carpenter 2004; Kuang and Moser 2009).”