War as a Commitment Problem

By Robert Powell. International Organization, 2004

861 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c1326170cf6201586f0281177bcd4259a70cdae5

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Citations in the corpus

Economic Shocks and Civil War (2009, background): “12For an extensive discussion see Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006). condition for the rich group to prefer giving a land transfer T rather than ghting is simply (1 + ) T > P2 (1 c) : The left hand side of the condition is the payo¤ of transfering land and not attacking and the right hand side…”
Threat Perception in International Relations (2013, background): “an incentive to misrepresent information about their capabilities and their intentions (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 2006).”
War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict (2011, neutral): “…Papers by this author see: www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=168602 Mathias Thoenig DEEP - HEC Université de Lausanne 1015 Lausanne SWITZERLAND Email: mathias.thoenig@unil.ch For further Discussion Papers by this author see: www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=148955”
Economics of Conflict: An Overview (2006, background): “(1995), Powell (2006), and ourselves in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), has two key components: (i) Although short-term contracts, conditional on arming and under the threat of conflict, can be written, adversaries are unable to enforce long-term contracts on arming.”
Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2011, background): “That will be equivalent to assuming that the sup-n ≤ v g ≤ nL U port of n is broad enough to allow neither side to fully determine information sharing through its actions.) in the assumption of anonymous information sharing and in the assumption that rebel violence does not target noncombatants.”
The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of War (2007, background): “Let S(t) denote the entire surplus at the 1Our calculations use Slantchev’s (2004) data set, which separates war outcomes into those where one side is unable to continue the military contest and those where both sides agree to a settlement while still physically able to continue fighting…”