Arunava Sen

2001–2011

A researcher in the Science corpus: 3 papers; trusts 2 researchers and is trusted by 1 researcher here, as inferred from the citation graph.

Whom Arunava Sen trusts overall

Their strongest outbound trust, strongest first, inferred from their citations.

1. Philip J. Reny
2. Jean-Pierre Benoît

Who trusts Arunava Sen overall

1. Philip J. Reny

Papers from Arunava Sen's perspective

Ordered by how strongly the researchers Arunava Sen trusts endorse each paper. Same corpus, a different order for every researcher.

1. Optimal Auction Design
2. Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (ACM Conference on Economics and Computation)
3. Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
4. Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design
5. The Measurement of Intellectual Influence
6. Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
7. Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
8. Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment
9. Theory and practise of the g-index (Scientometrics)
10. How Does the Market Use Citation Data? The Hirsch Index in Economics (Social Science Research Network)

Their papers

• Tops-only domains (2011) — 71 citations
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation (2006) — 233 citations
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem (2001) — 51 citations