Tops-only domains

By S. Chatterji, Arunava Sen. 2011

71 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question: what are the characteristics of domains $${\mathcal D}$$ that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function $${f: {\mathcal D}^n \rightarrow A}$$ satisfying unanimity, has the tops-only property? We first impose a minimal richness condition which ensures that for every alternative a, there exists an admissible ordering where a is maximal. We identify conditions on $${\mathcal D}$$ that are sufficient for strategy-proofness and unanimity to imply tops onlyness in the general case of n voters and in the special case, n = 2. We provide an algorithm for constructing tops-only domains from connected graphs with elements of A as nodes. We provide several applications of our results. Finally, we relax the minimal richness assumption and partially extend our results.

Subfields: Computational Theory and Mathematics, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/88e84e8ca266b32bf047a45f362fec5569910783