Reasoning the fast and frugal way: models of bounded rationality.

By Gerd Gigerenzer, Daniel G. Goldstein. 1996

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Citations in the corpus

Manipulating and Measuring Model Interpretability (2018, background): “cuses on developing interpretable decision-making models. There are two common approaches. Since there is evidence that simple, transparent models can be as accurate as more complex, black-box models [4, 18, 28, 35, 65, 66], the ﬁrst approach is to createinherently simple models, such as point syste”
Inductive biases for deep learning of higher-level cognition (2020, background): “However, brains need fast inference [211], and most of the advances made with”
Simple Rules for Complex Decisions (2017, methodology): “g, unit weighting) lead to accurate predictions [4, 9, 12, 14]; in particular, our strategy incorporates feature selection and more general integer weights to generate a richer family of simple rules.”
Crises and Collective Socio-Economic Phenomena: Simple Models and Challenges (2012, background): “15 Gigerenzer provides a complementary interpretation [85, 86]: people tend to follow rules of thumb and routines.”
A Rose by Any Name? The Values Construct (2000, background): “Furthermore, because people generally use what has been described as the “fast and frugal” satisficing strategy— labeled the “take the best strategy” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996)—they may not always make decisions that lead to best possible living.”
Argumentation Schema and the Myside Bias in Written Argumentation (2009, background): “However, the tendency of readers to minimize cognitive load (ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; gigerenzar & goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1982) suggests that if the author can fill a counterargument slot in the reader’s schema, and then adequately address the counterargument, readers are more likely to be…”
How distinct are intuition and deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-induced decision modes (2009, methodology): “The experiment comprised 20 probabilistic inferences using city-size decision tasks (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).”
Do People Make Decisions Under Risk Based on Ignorance? An Empirical Test of the Priority Heuristic Against Cumulative Prospect Theory (2008, background): “The results highlight one fundamental risk of the simulation methods often cited to support fastand-frugal heuristics (e.g., Czerlinsky, Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).”
Recipient design in human communication: simple heuristics or perspective taking? (2012, background): “We set out to investigate whether or not recipient design in human communication can be fully explained by simple “fast and frugal” heuristics (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009; Shintel and Keysar, 2009).”
Correlations of cognitive reflection with judgments and choices (2010, background): “The theoretical interest of correspondence tasks is that good performance in them is typically explained by participants’ use of fast-and-frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer et al., 1999) and not by adherence to normative principles.”
Uncertainty, Knowledge Problems, and Entrepreneurial Action (2018, background): “…to comprehend and process probabilities with any degree of formal precision, even among professional probability theorists (Gigerenzer, 2003; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996), (b) the presence of known, well-formulated preferences that drive action (March, 1978), and (c) the need for and…”
Search strategies in decision making: the success of “success” (2004, background): “Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999) noted that discrimination and validity were negatively correlated in their German cities environment.”
Fast, frugal, and fit: Simple heuristics for paired comparison (2002, methodology): “This simple search rule defines a lexicographic strategy which has become known as the Take The Best heuristic (Gigerenzer and Goldstein , 1996).”
Dual Process Theories in Behavioral Economics and Neuroeconomics: a Critical Review (2019, background): “Firstly, when proponents of DPT refer to the rational capacities of System 2, this is based on a standard of rationality that is rooted in the norms of deductive logic and probability theory (Evans and Over 1996; Gigerenzer 1996; Stanovich 1999; Stein 1996).”