Fast, frugal, and fit: Simple heuristics for paired comparison

By Laura Martignon, Ulrich Hoffrage. 2002

317 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, General Decision Sciences, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f5f1bb338e807fce2333e1750e6e4173eb3dce4d

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Citations in the corpus

Why recognition is rational: Optimality results on single-variable decision rules (2010, methodology): “We consider decision heuristics as a set of weighting schemes embedded within the linear model, a standard formulation when evaluating performance, e.g., when one compares performance to that of regression (e.g., Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005).”
Ignoring information in binary choice with continuous variables: When is less “more”? (2005, background): “See also Martignon and Hoffrage (1999, 2002).”
Heuristic decision making. (2011, unknown): “…in comparative statements of the kind " strategy X is more accurate (frugal, fast) than Y in environment E " or in quantitative relations between the performance of strategy X when the structure of an environment changes (e.g., Baucells et al. 2008, Karelaia 2006, Martignon & Hoffrage 2002).”
Why Heuristics Work (2008, background): “For instance, if cue validities are highly skewed (noncompensatory), no linear strategy can be more accurate in fitting than the frugal take-the-best heuristic; yet if cue validities are equal, the tallying strategy is more accurate than the take-the-best heuristic (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002).”
The recognition heuristic: A decade of research (2011, background): “…compensatory processes, and vice versa (e.g., higher cue redundancy favors noncompensatory processing whereas higher independence between cues favors compensatory processing; see Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Hogarth & Karelaia, 2006; Katsikopoulos & Martignon, 2006; Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002).”
"Take-the-best" and other simple strategies: Why and when they work "well" with binary cues (2006, methodology): “First, TTB is 100% accurate for non-compensatory functions – as proven by Martignon and Hoffrage (1999, 2002) .”
Rationality for Mortals: How People Cope with Uncertainty (2008, background): “Other aspects of environment structure that ABC has analyzed include the mean validity of the cues, the predictability of the criterion, and the skewness of frequency distributions (Hertwig, Hoffrage, & Martignon 1999; Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002).”
How bad is incoherence (2016, background): “Research on Step 3 has identified three structural properties: noncompensatoriness (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002), dominance, and cumulative dominance (Baucells, Carrasco, & Hogarth, 2006).”
Inferences under time pressure: how opportunity costs affect strategy selection. (2008, background): “The most extreme form of this is when a heuristic uses a noncompensatory weighting schema, so that basically only one single cue is employed in making a prediction ( Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002 ).”
Fast and frugal forecasting (2009, background): “…(c) choose the alternative this cue favors Cue validities vary highly, moderate to high redundancy, scarce information (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005, 2006; Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999, 2002) Made predictions equally or more accurate than regression (Czerlinski, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 1999), neural…”
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences (2009, methodology): “Second, Schmitt and Martignon (2006) proved that the greedy version of take-the-best is more successful in data fitting than take-the-best; yet when tested empirically, take-the-best nevertheless made more correct predictions (Martignon & Hoffrage, 2002).”