Delegation and Incentive Compensation

By Venky Nagar. 2002

259 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Information Systems

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fd4b09e101790803009671e0100820d58ae95d29

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Citations in the corpus

Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms (2014, unknown): “15 Li, Minnis, Nagar, and Rajan (2009) find that CEOs of large firms”
Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers (2007, unknown): “2004; Roberts 2004) 6 and information asymmetry (Wruck and Jensen 1994; Baiman, Larcker and Rajan 1995; Nagar 2002; Christie et al. 2003; Abernethy et al. 2004; Roberts 2004).”
Political constraints, organization design and performance measurement in China's state-owned enterprises (2006, background): “The consideration of the interdependencies among these components adds another dimension to our understanding of organizational design and is consistent with recent studies in the management (Mendelson, 2000), economics (Delmastro, 2002) and accounting (Nagar, 2002) literatures.”
Rethinking Measurement of Pay Disparity and Its Relation to Firm Performance (2019, background): “In addition, growth opportunities lead firms to delegate more responsibility to lower-level employees and provide them with stronger incentives (Nagar 2002).”
Performance Measure Properties and Delegation (2006, methodology): “Second, I only examine a subset of organizational design variables and the analysis is therefore a partial equilibrium analysis (cf., Nagar 2002).”
Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performance standards (2002, background): “Hypothesis 1 may appear similar to predictions in the prior literature (e.g., Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993; Fisher and Govindarajan 1993; Bushman et al. 1994; Baiman et al. 1995; Nagar 2002).”
Centralization of franchising networks: evidence from the Austrian franchise sector (2004, background): “Although theoretical and empirical studies dealing with the allocation of decision rights exist in the organizational economics and accounting literature (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Dessein, 2000; Harris and Raviv, 2002; Christie et al., 1995; Baiman et al., 1995; Nagar, 2002), no prior research—with ”
Leadership and Control System Design (2010, methodology): “decision rights (Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith 1995; Keating 1997; Abernethy, Bouwens and van Lent 2004) as does the knowledge asymmetry between senior managers and subordinates (Gordon and Narayanan 1984; Baiman, Larcker and Rajan 1995; Nagar 2002; Christie, Joye and Watts 2003; Abernethy et al. 2”
Employee Selection as a Control System (2012, background): “Much of this literature has focused on testing theories about the interrelationships between delegation and incentive compensation and on selected determinants of these two choices (Nagar 2002, Abernethy et. al.”
Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication (2014, unknown): “2 See, for example, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), Baiman, Larcker, and Rajan (1995), Baker and Holmstrom (1995), Nagar (2002), Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), Christie et al. (2003), Moers (2006), and Ortega (2009).”
The Issue of Endogeneity within Theory-Based, Quantitative Management Accounting Research (2007, background): “If opposite effects are expected (see, e.g. Nagar, 2002), that is, b1 .”
Determinants of Control System Design in Divisionalized Firms (2004, methodology): “Prior research argues that the operating environment of a division influences corporate management’s decision to delegate decision rights (Brickley et al. 1997; Milgrom and Roberts 1995; Nagar 2002 ).”
Organizational Slack in Decentralized Firms: The Role of Business Unit Controllers (2006, background): “We expect that, for rapidly growing BUs and/or for BUs operating in highly uncertain environments, corporate headquarters have more difficulty keeping track of internal BU developments and consequently, there is more information asymmetry (see also, Baiman et al. 1995; Nagar 2002; Christie et al. 20”