Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performance standards

By Raffi Indjejikian, D. Nanda. 2002

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/2d33cd46eba89b174092bae06bf4b793b9cc9714

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Michael D. Shields
2. Joan Luft
3. M. Mateˇjka
4. John Harry Evans III
5. Raffi Indjejikian
6. M. Covaleski
7. Matthew Hall
8. Klaus Derfuss

In Strategy and Management

1. M. Mateˇjka
2. Michael D. Shields
3. John Harry Evans III
4. Raffi Indjejikian
5. Joan Luft
6. M. Covaleski

Citations in the corpus

• Is CEO Cash Compensation Punished for Poor Firm Performance (2010, unknown): “In contrast, results in Leone et al. (2006) suggest that CEO cash compensation is punished for poor stock return performance.”
• Budgeting Research: Three Theoretical Perspectives and Criteria for Selective Integration (2003, background): “Indjejikian & Nanda (2002) provide empirical evidence for their sample of managers at the CEO through plant-manager level showing that goal bonuses tend to be smaller when performance measures are noisier, but larger when organizations have greater growth opportunities and executives exercise…”
• Organizational Slack in Decentralized Firms: The Role of Business Unit Controllers (2006, result): “This finding is consistent with Indjejikian and Nanda (2002) and suggests that firms do not update BU managers' performance targets substantively to reflect”