Knowledge, Compensation, and Firm Value: An Empirical Analysis of Firm Communication

By Feng Li, Michael Minnis, Venky Nagar, Madhav V. Rajan. 2014

118 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7be0649d0a362b08a60887280814f30ae14a0bc2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Benjamin Segal
2. Rencheng Wang
3. Gilles Hilary
4. T. C. Green
5. Brandon Lock
6. Russell Jame
7. Charles Hsu
8. Anne L. Beatty

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Rencheng Wang
2. Benjamin Segal
3. Gilles Hilary
4. Charles Hsu
5. T. C. Green
6. Brandon Lock
7. Russell Jame

Citations in the corpus

• The Bright Side of Managerial Over-Optimism (2016, background): “…are under pressure to communicate effectively and making these comments requires both substantial preparation and an intimate knowledge of the company’s state of affairs.18 Prior literature (e.g., Li et al., 2014) shows that CEO participation in conference calls is correlated with firm performance.”
• Executive Extraversion: Career and Firm Outcomes (2018, background): “…a one-standard-deviation increase in professional connections (Rolodex) is associated with a 10.0 percent increase in CEO pay (134.69 3 0.00076); and Li et al. (2014) find that a one-standard-deviation increase in knowledge (Percent CEO Text) is associated with a 5.5 percent premium (24.2 3…”
• Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, unknown): “The results are robust to replacing the “Confidence” measure with the natural log of the total value of the CEO’s unexercised, but exercisable, options (as per Li et al., 2012; Schrand and Zechman, 2012).”