Conditional cooperation on three continents

By Martin G. Kocher, Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll, Robert J. Netzer, Matthias Sutter. 2008

393 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc67b24a50b06604e81f48a3962bf1e21a227025

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Simon Gächter
2. Martin G. Kocher
3. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
4. Matthias Sutter
5. E. Renner
6. Benedikt Herrmann
7. Jonathan Woon
8. Urs Fischbacher

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Matthias Sutter
2. Martin G. Kocher
3. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
4. Simon Gächter
5. Urs Fischbacher
6. Christian Thöni
7. Winfried Ruigrok
8. Aldo Rustichini

In Safety Research

1. Simon Gächter
2. Matthias Sutter
3. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
4. Martin G. Kocher
5. Urs Fischbacher
6. Ernst Fehr
7. Christian Thöni
8. Benedikt Herrmann

Citations in the corpus

• The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments (2012, background): “See Kocher et al. (2008), Herrmann and Thöni (2009) and Volk et al. (2012).”
• Temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences (2012, result): “This is not completely unexpected, as other replication studies of the FGF design (e.g., Herrmann and Thöni, 2009; Kocher et al., 2008; Thöni et al., 2009) also find a lower percentage of Hump-shaped patterns.”
• Individuals and Teams in UMTS-License Auctions (2007, background): “Kocher and Sutter (2005), Kocher et al. (200 6) and Sutter (2005) have found teams to be more successful than individuals in beauty-conte st games.”
• An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods (2011, background): “Our claim regarding the presence of different types of allocators is similar to the literature explaining cooperation with the presence of heterogeneous motives, including “conditional cooperators” (Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001; Herrmann and Thöni 2009; Kocher et al. 2008; Ostrom 1998, 2000).”
• The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments (2010, background): “1977), or it might be an expression of reciprocity or “conditional cooperation” in general (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010; Croson 2007; Kocher et al. 2008; Muller et al. 2008; Herrmann and Thöni 2009; Neugebauer et al. 2009; Thöni et al. 2009).”
• Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples (2013, background): “For example, more than half of the participants in public goods game experiments are found to be “conditionally cooperative” – they are willing to forgo material gain and cooperate if others cooperate as well (see, e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001; Herrmann and Thoni 2009; Kocher et al. 2008).”
• Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication study in Russia (2009, background): “ Kocher et al. (2007) , who investigated conditional cooperation of student subjects in Austria, Japan and USA and found the percentage of conditional cooperators to be almost twice as high in the USA (81 percent) than in the other two subject pools (44 and 42 percent).”
• Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments (2010, neutral): “Kocher et al. (2008); Laurent Muller et al.”