Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods Experiments

By Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter. 2010

481 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/847be3bd6ec52553e17658443d9cd8df5b61e325

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Simon Gächter
2. E. Renner
3. Daniele Nosenzo
4. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
5. Attila Ambrus
6. Parag A. Pathak
7. Alexander Vostroknutov
8. David Y. Yang

In Safety Research

1. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
2. Simon Gächter
3. Ananish Chaudhuri
4. Aldo Rustichini
5. Daniele Nosenzo
6. Ernst Fehr
7. E. Renner
8. Attila Ambrus

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
2. Attila Ambrus
3. Daniele Nosenzo
4. Simon Gächter
5. E. Renner
6. Erik O. Kimbrough
7. Alexander Vostroknutov
8. David Y. Yang

Citations in the corpus

• NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL: Norms Make Preferences Social (2015, background): “Extending this line of argument, Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) propose that declining contributions in repeated public goods games are driven by individual preferences for conditional cooperation.”
• The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale (2013, unknown): “These results allow reconciling the evidence about for instance Fischbacher and Gachter (2010) and references therein. of the few examples is Kube and Traxler (2011), who provide experimental evidence that the introduction of formal sanctions crowds out punishment n social norms. a refer to…”
• The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments (2010, background): “…(e.g., Dawes, et al. (1977)), or it might be an expression of reciprocity or “conditional cooperation” in general (e.g., Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Fischbacher and Gächter (2010); Croson (2007); Kocher, et al. (2008); Muller, et al. (2008); Herrmann and Thöni (2009); Neugebauer, et al. (2009);…”
• Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Formal, Informal, and No Sanction Regimes (2011, unknown): “Candidate points of departure include the potential presence of nonstandard types (Kreps et al. 1982), altruism, warm glow (Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997), inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and a preference for cooperation if others likewise cooperate (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010).”
• Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments (2011, background): “Other experiments that elicit beliefs in linear public goods games incentivize the revelation of beliefs, but usually with small stakes to mitigate this concern (see e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter 2010).”
• Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations (2009, unknown): “…which in public good games translates into conditional cooperation (for evidence see, Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010) or, in our context, a relative contribution rule , meaning that one should contribute a ‘fair amount’ in relation to…”
• Misperceptions About Others (2021, background): “…Bordalo et al. 2019) and of voters’ beliefs about others’ behaviors in response to policy change (e.g., Dal Bó et al. 2018), in addition to work in the context of games of public goods contribution (e.g., Fischbacher & Gächter 2010) and of altruism and dictator games (e.g., Di Tella et al. 2015).”