Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication study in Russia

By Benedikt Herrmann, Christian Thöni. 2009

200 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0b121edfc5501384ffaf30f7bdfc519eaaa0edce

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Simon Gächter
2. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
3. E. Renner
4. Urs Fischbacher
5. Daniele Nosenzo
6. Simone Quercia
7. Ernst Fehr
8. Winfried Ruigrok

In Safety Research

1. Simon Gächter
2. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
3. Urs Fischbacher
4. Christian Thöni
5. Ernst Fehr
6. Ananish Chaudhuri
7. E. Renner
8. Armin Falk

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Jeffrey P. Carpenter
2. Christian Thöni
3. Simon Gächter
4. Urs Fischbacher
5. Ananish Chaudhuri
6. Winfried Ruigrok
7. Stefan Volk
8. E. Renner

Citations in the corpus

• Microfoundations of Social Capital (2012, unknown): “For example, the shares for Conditional cooperators and Free riders are in Fischbacher et al. (2001) 50% and 30% for Swiss subjects, in Herrmann and Thöni (2009) 56% and 6% for Russian subjects, in Kocher et al. (2007) 81% and 8% for US subjects, in Burlando and Guala (2003) 76% and 9% for Italian…”
• The behavioral validity of the strategy method in public good experiments (2012, background): “See Kocher et al. (2008), Herrmann and Thöni (2009) and Volk et al. (2012).”
• The effects of (incentivized) belief elicitation in public goods experiments (2010, background): “…(1977)), or it might be an expression of reciprocity or “conditional cooperation” in general (e.g., Fischbacher, et al. (2001); Fischbacher and Gächter (2010); Croson (2007); Kocher, et al. (2008); Muller, et al. (2008); Herrmann and Thöni (2009); Neugebauer, et al. (2009); Thöni, et al. (2009).”
• Personality, personal values and cooperation preferences in public goods games: A longitudinal study (2011, background): “…cooperators who condition their cooperation on the behavior of others by behaving cooperatively in response to cooperation but non-cooperatively in response to free riding (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Herrmann & Thöni, 2009; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986).”
• Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples (2013, background): “For example, more than half of the participants in public goods game experiments are found to be “conditionally cooperative” – they are willing to forgo material gain and cooperate if others cooperate as well (see, e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001; Herrmann and Thoni 2009; Kocher et al. 2008).”