The Role of Power and Politics in the Repricing of Executive Options

By Timothy G. Pollock, Harald M. Fischer, James B. Wade. 2002

148 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We explore how CEO power affects the repricing of executive options. The spread between an option's exercise, or strike, price, and the market value of a stock impacts the likelihood of repricing. ...

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f572b171092928ec60be766be5a39c2e0fae250e

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Citations in the corpus

The Pacification of Institutional Investors (2008, methodology): “Management theorists have proposed that powerful institutional investors will pressure boards to control executive compensation and maximize the use of long-term incentives that make pay contingent on performance (Useem, 1996; Pollock, Fischer, and Wade, 2002).”
EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POWER ON SURVIVING TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE: THE CASE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS (2004, background): “…of underpricing a company experiences when its stock begins trading can affect stakeholder expectations regarding its potential, and thus its ability following the IPO to acquire resources (e.g., Jegadeesh, Weinstein, & Welch, 1993; Pollock et al., 2002) that could enhance its survival chances.”
Overpaid CEOs and Underpaid Managers: Fairness and Executive Compensation (2006, background): “Other researchers have found similar effects for the impact of power and influence on executive compensation (e.g., Belliveau et al. 1996, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989, Lambert et al. 1993, Pollock et al. 2002, Wade et al. 1990).”
Stealthy Footsteps to the Boardroom: Executives' Backgrounds, Sophisticated Interpersonal Influence Behavior, and Board Appointments (2010, background): “…of outside directors appointed after the CEO, relative CEO-board tenure, the portion of the board composed of affi liated directors, and separation of the CEO and board chair positions (cf. Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Pollock, Fischer, and Wade, 2002; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009).”
The Effects of Market Competition, Capital Structure, and CEO Duality on Firm Performance: A Mediation Analysis by Incorporating the GMM Model Technique (2020, background): “From an agency theory perspective, extant research found a negative impact of the CEO duality and firm performance relationship due to reasons such as CEO private benefits and CEO replacement cost or extra cost relevant to the CEO [34,35].”
CEO Narcissism and the Impact of Prior Board Experience on Corporate Strategy (2015, unknown): “Percentage of outside directors appointed after the CEO was measured by the percentage of outside directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure (e.g., Pollock, Fischer, and Wade, 2002).”
Effects of an Advancing Tenure on CEO Cognitive Complexity (2020, background): “In recent years, researchers have come to rely heavily on the indicators we use here to measure CEO power (Briscoe et al., 2014; Pollock et al., 2002; Shi et al., 2019). their decisions to others (high power) exhibited lower cognitive complexity than those who were told that they would have to…”