Remote timing attacks are practical

By David Brumley, Dan Boneh. Comput. Networks, 2003

842 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f501629c7835ae7fb835ce234ce25a9b415e2e23

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Citations in the corpus

BiTR: Built-in Tamper Resilience (2011, neutral): “and timing [11].”
Side-Channel Attacks: Ten Years After Its Publication and the Impacts on Cryptographic Module Security Testing (2005, neutral): “Brumley and Boneh [54] demonstrated that timing attacks can reveal RSA private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server over a local network.”
Wait a Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES (2014, neutral): “Brumley and Boneh performed a practical attack against RSA in [10].”
On the power of simple branch prediction analysis (2007, neutral): “But contrary to many other papers, cf. [ BB ,DKLM+,Sch], whose target is this spe-”
The most dangerous code in the world: validating SSL certificates in non-browser software (2012, positive): “Other side-channel attacks include a timing attack that extracts the private key from OpenSSL implementations [2].”
Intel SGX Explained (2016, neutral): “Despite these difficulties, cache timing attacks are known to retrieve cryptographic keys used by AES [25, 146], RSA [28], Diffie-Hellman [123], and elliptic-curve cryptography [27].”
Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices (2020, neutral): “For instance, the power consumption of the CPU performing encryption and decryption and the timing of the signals are common side channels, which can threaten implementations of both quantum and conventional cryptographic systems (Brumley and Boneh, 2005; Kocher et al., 1999).”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, neutral): “On a local area network, the timing of the decryption operation on a web server could reveal information about private keys stored on the server [15].”
A Formal Foundation for Secure Remote Execution of Enclaves (2017, neutral): “Side channel observations, such as attacks observing cache timing, are known to compromise cryptographic keys used by numerous cryptosystems [10, 13, 14, 34].”
Sanctum: Minimal Hardware Extensions for Strong Software Isolation (2016, positive): “Cache timing attacks are known to retrieve cryptographic keys used by AES [9], RSA [11], Diffie-Hellman [30], and elliptic-curve cryptography [10].”
HVLearn: Automated Black-Box Analysis of Hostname Verification in SSL/TLS Implementations (2017, neutral): “These attacks include various protocol based attacks [35], [43], [44], [46] as well as timing attacks [37] and flaws in pseudo-random number genera-”
Preventing Page Faults from Telling Your Secrets (2016, positive): “Timing and cache attacks have been used to by-pass kernel space ASLR [29], VMs [30], android applications [31], cloud servers [55] and users [40] both locally and remotely [14].”
Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations (2014, background): “Flaws in SSL server implementations can be exploited for chosen-ciphertext attacks, resulting in private key compromise [8, 9].”
Raccoon: Closing Digital Side-Channels through Obfuscated Execution (2015, background): “…secret key, but because the Taken branch is computationally more expensive than the Not Taken branch, an adversary who can measure the time it takes to execute an iteration of the loop can infer whether the branch was Taken or Not Taken, thereby inferring the value of s one bit at a time [31, 5].”