Architecture for protecting critical secrets in microprocessors

By Ruby B. Lee, P. Kwan, J. P. McGregor, Jeffrey S. Dwoskin, Zhenghong Wang. 2005

229 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Artificial Intelligence

In Hardware and Architecture

Citations in the corpus

Geppetto: Versatile Verifiable Computation (2015, background): “Prior work on verifying computation focused on narrow classes of computation [32, 51], relied on physical-security assumptions [41, 47], assumed uncorrelated failures [19, 20], or achieved good asymptotics [2, 28, 30, 31, 33, 38, 44] but impractical concrete performance [46, 50].”
Pinocchio: Nearly Practical Verifiable Computation (2013, background): “For example, systems based on replication [1, 7, 8] assume uncorrelated failures, while those based on Trusted Computing [9–11] or other secure hardware [12–15] assume that physical protections cannot be defeated.”
Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys (2008, background): “Others haveproposed architectures that would routinely encrypt the contents of memory for security purposes [28, 27 , 17].”
Overshadow: a virtualization-based approach to retrofitting protection in commodity operating systems (2008, background): “Categories and Subject Descriptors D.4.6[Operating Systems]: Security and Protection GeneralTerms Design, Security, Performance Keywords Virtual Machine Monitors, VMM, Hypervisors, Operating Systems, Memory Protection, Multi-Shadowing, Cloaking 1.”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, background): “The adversary also controls the cloud provider’s entire software stack, including the host OS, hypervisor, management software, platform ﬁrmware, BIOS, code executing in system management mode, and device ﬁrmware.”
Komodo: Using verification to disentangle secure-enclave hardware from software (2017, background): “A wide range of systems have used hardware to isolate sensitive code from an untrusted OS [15, 16, 26, 27, 50, 53, 67, 82].”
Aegis: A Single-Chip Secure Processor (2007, background): “at Princeton recently proposed a secret-protected (SP) architecture [69].”
SecChisel Framework for Security Verification of Secure Processor Architectures (2019, background): “, XOM [15], AEGIS [19], SP [11], Bastion [8], or HyperWall [20].”
Eliminating the hypervisor attack surface for a more secure cloud (2011, background): “mechanisms for protecting applications and trusted software modules [24, 34, 21, 12], including Bastion [10] which uses a full hypervisor.”
Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution (2013, background): “Other names and brands may be claimed as the property of others.”