Stock and Option Grants with Performance-Based Vesting Provisions

By J. Bettis, John M. Bizjak, Jeffrey L. Coles, Swaminathan L. Kalpathy. 2010

201 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f44d291185b30d8455c90e9bf6e565ccd6fce086

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Citations in the corpus

Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (2015, unknown): “6 See, for example, Bettis et al. (2010), who analyze vesting provisions in stock and option grants; Sautner and Weber (2011), who study stock options plans for Europeans firms using proprietary data; and Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997), who use proprietary data to investigate the use of financial”
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016, unknown): “…accounting performance measures (such as sales growth, return-on-assets, and earnings per share growth) through their impact on discretionary bonuses, performance-based vesting provisions (Bettis et al. 2010), and subjective evaluations by principals (e.g., Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist 2013).”
Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms (2015, background): “For example Larcker (1983) finds a positive market reaction to the introduction of performance-based plans, and Bettis et al. (2010) find that companies introducing performance-based features in compensation contracts have significantly better subsequent operating performance than control firms.”
What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, background): “However, we caution that vesting conditions on equity awards may also result in distorting managerial incentives to pursue short-term interests (Bettis et al., 2010).”
Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, methodology): “Indeed, Bettis et al. (2010) document that performancebased (i.e., state-dependent) vesting is increasingly popular, where vesting is accelerated upon high returns.1 However, this type of vesting may induce the CEO to in ate the stock price (an action not featured in Brisley) and cash out.”
Endogeneity in CEO power: A survey and experiment (2016, unknown): “…Gulen, and Ovtchinikov (2010) on the relationship between political contribution and stock return, Polk and Sapienza (2009) on investment and future firm performance, Bettis et al. (2009) on managerial stock vesting and future performance, and Ang and Bekaert (2007) on earnings and cash flow.”