An Analysis of Stock Recommendations

By John Morgan, Phillip C. Stocken. 2003

333 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f4378a828b90218c92840108cd5fcecd887aa769

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Citations in the corpus

Information Aggregation in Polls (2008, background): “All of the above models share the feature 2 One exception is Morgan and Stocken (2003) who consider a single expert case where the preferences of the expert are private information.”
Authority and Communication in Organizations (2002, background): “In a setting where the agent has a bias b only with a probability p, Stocken and Morgan (2000) provide a first analysis of the communication equilibrium which then prevails.”
Credulity, lies, and costly talk (2007, neutral): “It is worth comparing our findings with those obtained by Morgan and Stocken [21] in a model of cheap talk where the sender has private information not only about the state (with bounded support, as in CS) but also about his bias, which can be either a positive, state-independent constant or zero.”
Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry (2007, background): “For example, Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Morgan and Stocken (2003) discuss a conflict of interest similar to the one we look at in the context of stock recommendations.”
The strategy of professional forecasting (2006, background): “This result is consistent with the findings of Osborne and Pitchik (1986) and Laster et al.”
Manipulability of Future‐Independent Tests (2008, background): “See Morgan and Stocken (2003) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) (among others) for cheap-talk games between forecasters and decision-makers.”
Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation (2009, background): “Benabou and Laroque (1992), Morgan and Stocken (2003) and, more recently, Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007) analyze the conflict of interest between the buyer and seller in this environment.”
How Do Analysts Use Their Earnings Forecasts in Generating Stock Recommendations (2001, neutral): “1 4 Because there are relatively few Sell recommendations, rational investors essentially interpret Hold recommendations as Sell recommendations (Morgan and Stocken 1998).”
Trade Generation, Reputation and Sell-Side Analysts (2005, background): “Proof of Proposition 3: See Appendix 4.”
Open source information, investor attention, and asset pricing (2013, background): “On the other hand, researchers as well practitioners spend a lot of time on trading volume (Campbell et al., 1993; Choi et al., 2002;Wang, 1994), security analyst recommendation (Barber et al., 2001; Morgan and Stocken, 2003),and technical analysis (Brock et al., 1992).”
A Signaling Theory of Grade Inflation (2007, neutral): “3 Morgan and Stocken (2003) use a standard cheap talk model to study the incentive structure in stock recommendations.”
The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in Sell-Side Research (2009, background): “2 See Benabou and Laroque (1992), Morgan and Stocken (2003), Jackson (2005), and references therein for the theoretical discussions of the trade-offs analysts face and the role of reputation.”