Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry

By Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas, Joel D. Shapiro. 2007

217 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f8861ba8b71c7a577c597c32b6a4facc608306da

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Citations in the corpus

Strategic Obfuscation and Consumer Protection Policy (2014, unknown): “2 In 1 Relying on outside advice may not help in making good decisions as this advice may be biased due to agency problems between ﬁnancial institutions, their sales agents and consumers (Bolton et al. (2007); Inderst and Ottaviani (2009, 2012); Woodward and Hall (2012)).”
Referral Programs and Customer Value. (2011, background): “Though some basic banking products like checking accounts are well known to most customers, the wider set of financial services provided by banks are considered experience goods rather than search goods (e.g., Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro 2007; Parasuraman, Zeithaml, and Berry 1985).”
Bank Size, Capital, and Systemic Risk: Some International Evidence (2016, unknown): “…a third view, the agency cost hypothesis, large and complex banks that engage in multiple activities (e.g., combining lending and trading) suffer from increased agency problems and poor corporate governance that can translate into systemic risk (e.g., Bolton et al., 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007).”
Is Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study (2012, background): “How can regulation convince a person to follow unbiased and sound financial advice, when we do not completely understand why people follow advice? Though the answer to this question is beyond the 7 Campbell (2006), and especially Campbell et al. (2011), recognize that consumers need financial protec”
How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection ☆ (2012, methodology): “This simple way of modeling the suitability concern follows Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) and Inderst and Ottaviani (2009).13 The adviser s concern for suitability may have di¤erent origins.”
Financial Literacy and the Demand for Financial Advice (2015, unknown): “In Krausz and Paroush (2002) and Bolton et al. (2007) the bias of intermediaries providing advice is related to market competitiveness. For our purposes, a particularly relevant strand of this literature is the one focusing on investors’ characteristics and on how these affect information transmissi”
The Credit Ratings Game (2012, unknown): “In contrast, in Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007), information revelation came from the banks’ need to di¤erentiate their products.”