The strategy of professional forecasting

By Marco Ottaviani, Peter Norman Sørensen. 2006

327 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc5ffe6dee22fd2308169a9f908c01f2eea3ee7f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

In Safety Research

Citations in the corpus

Quantifying Cognitive Biases in Analyst Earnings Forecasts (2006, unknown): “Other papers identify different circumstances under which one would observe either herding or exaggeration (Ehrbeck and Waldmann, 1996; Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2001).”
Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition (2007, unknown): “Similarly, actions are also substitutes in Cournot markets (Vives 1988) and winner-take-all forecasting contests (Ottaviani and Sorensen 2006).”
Manipulability of Future‐Independent Tests (2008, background): “See Morgan and Stocken (2003) and Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) (among others) for cheap-talk games between forecasters and decision-makers.”
Do Analysts Herd? An Analysis of Recommendations and Market Reactions (2010, unknown): “Prendergast and Stole (1996) present a model where the opposite incentives are present.”
The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in Sell-Side Research (2009, methodology): “19 Huber (1967) and White (1980). 20 We followed the methodology described in Appendix D of Loughran and Ritter (2004) to divide our sample of firms into tech and non-tech firms.”
Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005, background): “20 Ottaviani and Sørensen (2004) consider a related model, with nor-”
Uncertainty and Currency Crises: Evidence from Survey Data (2010, background): “Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006) consider two other possible strategic objectives of forecasters: a winner-take-all contest, in which the forecaster whose prediction turns out to be closest to the fundamental wins a prize, and a reputational-cheap-talk game, an incomplete information game in which…”
Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations (2006, unknown): “For example, in experiments where individuals were asked to estimate the price of a car, when subjects took a buyer’s perspective–a case where overestimates of the car’s true price were more costly than underestimates–they tended to underestimate the price.”
Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets (2008, unknown): “, DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2001) and Ozsoylev (2005). DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) provide a general analysis of the effects of persuasion bias in social networks.”
Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness (2008, unknown): “This model is related to models of strategic forecasting (see, for instance, Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2006).”
Explanations of the inconsistencies in survey respondents'forecasts (2010, unknown): “…incentives to act strategically in the sense of balancing accuracy against con ‡icting aims, such as convincing the market that they are well-informed, or of attracting media attention (see, e.g., Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006)).”