Trade Generation, Reputation and Sell-Side Analysts

By Andrew B. Jackson. 2005

663 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/48b52ef6a413b40a51716034a1c7efc3a7954475

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Citations in the corpus

Company reputation and the cost of equity capital (2014, neutral): “Studies 2 See, for example, Reynolds and Francis (2001) and Larcker and Richardson (2004) for evidence related to auditors; Jackson (2005), Cowen et al. (2006), Clarke et al. (2007), and Fang and Yasuda (2009) for evidence related to financial analysts; and Jo et al. (2007) for evidence related to…”
Air pollution, affect, and forecasting bias: Evidence from Chinese financial analysts (2019, background): “Following Jackson (2005) and the vast literature in accounting on earnings forecasts, we define analysts’ forecast optimism as follows:”
On the fast track: Information acquisition costs and information production (2020, methodology): “Because earnings forecasts are issued throughout the year, we also use one additional control variable, the natural log of forecast duration, to account for the positive relation between forecast duration and forecast errors documented in prior studies (e.g., Jackson 2005).”
On the Information Role of Stock Recommendation Revisions (2009, methodology): “Analogously, measures of abnormal trading around revisions are likely to be confounded with abnormal trading triggered by events and news (Irvine, 2001; Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004; Jackson, 2005; Jeurgens and Lindsey, 2006).”
Do sell-side analysts exhibit differential target price forecasting ability? (2012, neutral): “This is consistent with arguments made in Francis and Philbrick (1993) and Jackson (2005) regarding analysts’ attempts to curry favor with management or generating trading revenues for their firms.”
Managing Underwriters and the Marketing of Seasoned Equity Offerings (2010, neutral): “As suggested by Irvine (2001), Jackson (2005), Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009), and Niehaus and Zhang (2010), investors in a stock are likely to trade more through market makers with which they have a relationship.”