Local environmental control and institutional crowding-out.

By Juan-Camilo Cardenas, J. Stranlund, C. Willis. 2000

571 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f3d4185ef0bb1e66324a1b43dd81c1db593b2feb

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Citations in the corpus

Public Participation and Institutional Fit: A Social–Psychological Perspective (2013, background): “Because of this, they are not as voluntary or self-sustaining as intrinsically motivated behaviors, and they tend to cease when external (re) enforcement ceases (Deci et al. 1999, Cardenas et al. 2000, Frey and Jegen 2001, Bowles 2008).”
The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance (2011, result): “Cardenas et al. (2000) found that in these same experiments where the optimal rule was imposed and modestly enforced, the performance was lower than experiments where participants were allowed to have face-to-face communication.”
Norms from outside and from inside: an experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems (2004, background): “Following the analysis of external regulation in Cardenas et al. (2000), we introduce in the problem a regulation in the form of a penalty f, externally imposed with certain probability P, to individual allocations above what the social optimal solution requires.”
The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources (2006, background): “Cardenas et al. (2000) report on five experiments conducted in Columbia where subjects were told that a new rule would go into force that mandated that they should spend no more than the optimal level of time in the forest each round.”
Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution (2003, background): “(Beckenkamp and Ostmann, 1999; Cardenas et al., 2000) or because the experimental design is for other reasons too different from ours (Yamagishi, 1988; McCusker and Carnevale, 1995).”
Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field Experimental Evidence from Fishermen in Toyama Bay (2011, unknown): “…to Amazonia to find participants who look remotely like the self-interested agent that much of traditional economic theory is built around and Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000) demonstrated how institutions can crowd out social preferences for cooperation among rural farmers in Colombia.”
Comparison of empirical methods for building agent-based models in land use science (2007, background): “For example, using different rules (i.e. treatments) the impact of communication can be quantified (Cardenas et al. 2000).”
Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World (2008, background): “Fairness in developing countries (ultimatum game studies) Study Location Students Mean proposal Rejection rate Carpenter et al. (2005a) United States Yes 0.”
Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-Deterrent (2006, unknown): “22 Our experiment remains silent on these potential long-run effects since contribution decisions are not repeated (see Cardenas et al. 2000, Huck 1998 or Kahan 2000 on potential long-run effects).”
Motivation crowding by economic incentives in conservation policy: A review of the empirical evidence (2015, background): “Or, consider the following alternative explanation for the erosion of the incentive effect after the introduction of a weakly enforced fine (e.g. Cardenas et al., 2000; Reichhuber et al., 2009), based on limited cognition rather than motivational changes.”
Carbon pricing in climate policy: seven reasons, complementary instruments, and political economy considerations (2017, background): “Motivational crowding out may arise when financial incentives or punishments undermine intrinsic motivations to contribute to public goods, including environmental policy or public goods issues.(101) This has stimulated critiques that (carbon) pricing may be less effective than expected ex ante, bec”
What Motivates Common Pool Resource Users? Experimental Evidence from the Field (2009, unknown): “Cardenas et al. (2000) found that external regulation of a common pool resource tended to crowd out other-regarding behavior in favor of more selfinterested choices.”
Social Capital and Community Governance (2002, background): “…or environmental conservation by mobilising self-interested motives through the use of fines and sanctions may undermine reciprocity and other social motives (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, Bewley, 1995; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Cardenas et al., 2000), as well as other sources cited in Bowles (1998).”
Modelling with stakeholders (2010, background): “For example, Cardenas et al. (2000) conducted experiments with stakeholders to test the importance of the environmental, social and cultural contexts.”