The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
By Brian Skyrms. 2003
894 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- Michael Kaisers
- Iyad Rahwan
- Karl Tuyls
- Daan Bloembergen
- Daniel Hennes
- Xiaolong Wang
In Sociology and Political Science
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- Carlos P. Roca
- Ángel Sánchez
- José A. Cuesta
- A. Melis
- Daan Bloembergen
- Michael Kaisers
In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- R. Layton
- Carlos P. Roca
- Ángel Sánchez
- José A. Cuesta
- Simon Shaolei Du
- Joshua A. Kroll
Citations in the corpus
- Discovering Diverse Multi-Agent Strategic Behavior via Reward Randomization (2021, background): “Consider an extremely simple example, a 2-by-2 matrix game Stag-Hunt (Rousseau, 1984; Skyrms, 2004), where two pure strategy NEs exist: a “risky” cooperative equilibrium with the highest payoff ∗Equal contribution.”
- Optimal control as a graphical model inference problem (2009, neutral): “In this section we consider a variant of the stag hunt game, a prototype game of social conflict between personal risk and mutual benefit (Skyrms 2004).”
- Evolutionary Dynamics of Multi-Agent Learning: A Survey (2015, methodology): “Evolutionary Dynamics of Multi-Agent Learning C D C D 3, 3 5, 0 0, 5 1, 1 S H S H 4, 4 3, 1 1, 3 3, 3 H T H T 1, 0 0, 1 0, 1 1, 0 Figure 3: Payoff matrix for the Prisoner's Dilemma (left), the Stag Hunt (center), and Matching Pennies (right).”
- The Interface Theory of Perception (2009, neutral): “... maps, (8) considering time and energy costs that vary with architecture (e.g., serial versus parallel) and that are probabilistic functions of the amount of information gleaned and (9) extending the replicator dynamics, e.g., to include communication between players and to include a spatial dime”
- Communication and collective action: language and the evolution of human cooperation (2010, background): “Thus, the payoffs do conform to synergistic mutualism, a game of assurance (or a " stag hunt, " after Rousseau — see Skyrms, 2004).”
- The role of incentives and communication in strategic alliances: an experimental investigation (2009, background): “The individual decision to hunt the stag entails both the potential for greater mutual benefit and the potential for greater personal risk (Skyrms, 2003).”
- Cooperating with machines (2017, methodology): “ile AI relies on computationally intensive search and random exploration to generate strategic behavior, human cooperation appears to rely on intuition [11], cultural norms [12], emotions and signals [13, 14], and pre-evolved dispositions toward cooperation [17]. In particular, cheap talk (i.e., cos”
- Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions (2010, background): “The predatory action can be thought of as a strong form of defecting.”
- Learning to compete, coordinate, and cooperate in repeated games using reinforcement learning (2011, background): “Unfortunately, while sometimes necessary, using mixed strategies can make it difficult to strike profitable compromises in some important repeated games, since stochastic behavior can portray unclear signals (Axelrod 1984; Skyrms 2004 ).”
- Navigating Into the Future or Driven by the Past (2013, background): “Such behavior exhibits a failure to solve the “Stag Hunt” problem, first identified as essential to understanding human sociability by JeanJacques Rousseau (see Skyrms, 1996, 2004).”
- Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge? (2008, background): “In spite of Brian Skyrms' book [24] The Stag Hunt, the Stag Hunt Game seems to be less widely known than the Prisoners' Dilemma.”
- The psychology of coordination and common knowledge. (2014, methodology): “The problem of coordination and common knowledge has been examined by many disciplines, including political science (Ostrom, 1990), philosophy (Hume, 1739–1740/1969; Lewis, 1969, Rousseau, 1754/1984; Skyrms, 2004), economics (Chwe, 2001; Geanakoplos, 1992), linguistics (Clark, 1992, 1996; Smith, 198”
- Institutions, rules, and equilibria: a unified theory* (2014, neutral): “4 See e.g. Lewis (1969), Ullmann-Margalit (1977), Sugden (1986), Skyrms (1996, 2004), Calvert (1998), Young (1998), Aoki (2001), Vanderschraaf (2001), Binmore (2005), Bicchieri (2006).”