THE S UPPLY O F I NFORMATION BY A C ONCERNED EXPERT
By Andrew Caplin, John Leahy. 2004
140 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1d301708a14d4ff1c47acee39038f90c46bdbefe
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In General Decision Sciences
- George Loewenstein
- Matthew Rabin
- B. Kőszegi
- Pierpaolo Battigalli
- Martin A. Dufwenberg
- Russell Golman
- Michaela Pagel
- Larry G. Epstein
In Management Science and Operations Research
- B. Kőszegi
- George Loewenstein
- Pierpaolo Battigalli
- Martin A. Dufwenberg
- Matthew Rabin
- Russell Golman
- Larry G. Epstein
- Yona Rubinstein
In Safety Research
- Martin A. Dufwenberg
- Pierpaolo Battigalli
- B. Kőszegi
- Matthew Rabin
- George Loewenstein
- Russell Golman
- Larry G. Epstein
- Yona Rubinstein
Citations in the corpus
- Information Gaps: A Theory of Preferences Regarding the Presence and Absence of Information (2018, background): “Caplin and Leahy (2004), for example, offer a clear demonstration that the revealed preference framework is insufficient to analyze benevolent information disclosure policies.”
- Fear and the Response to Terrorism: An Economic Analysis (2011, background): “[12] __________, "The Supply of Information by a Concerned Expert," Economic Journal, 114 (2004), 487-505.”
- Living with Risk (2008, background): “Elsewhere [3], they acknowledge that such an expanded domain poses challenges for gathering evidence, and they suggest that surveys, physiological measures and brain scans might serve as sources of evidence.”
- Reference-Dependent Consumption Plans (2009, methodology): “As a complement to models—such as Caplin and Leahy (2001, 2004), Caplin and Eliaz (2003), and Kőszegi (2006a)—that assume directly a taste or distaste for information, we derive such tastes from the same preferences towards good and bad news that (as we interpret is) underlie prospect theory, and…”
- Dynamic psychological games (2009, background): “In Caplin & Leahy (2004) v ti depends also on p tj , j = i.”