Arms Races and Negotiations

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Economic Shocks and Civil War (2009, background): “Kydd (1997) and Baliga and Sjöstrom (2004) provide formal theories of this phenomenon.”
Global Games: Theory and Applications (2003, unknown): “See Baliga and Sjöström (2001) in an incomplete information context (where global heterogeneity corresponds to independent types); Herrendorf, Valentinyi, andWaldmann (2000) and Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000) in models of large population interactions; and Frankel (2000b) in the context of a dynamic ”
Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk (2008, unknown): “d∆pred dλ = k ∂Fi ∂ki > 0 (5) d∆−i pred dλ = k ∂F−i ∂ki < 0 (6) d∆preempt dλ = k [ ∂Wi ∂ki − ∂Si ∂ki ] (7) d∆−i preempt dλ = k [ ∂W−i ∂ki − ∂S−i ∂ki ] .”
Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs (2010, background): “The vanguard chooses a level of effort, t ∗ > t, and the population plays s L .”
War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict (2011, unknown): “Mühlebachstrasse 86 8008 Zürich SWITZERLAND”
The Global Arms Trade Network 1950-2007 (2012, background): “4 Results Columns (1)-(3) in Table 1 display the results from estimating (9) on arms trade using pooled OLS.”