Simultaneous Signaling and Screening with Warranties

By D. Soberman. 2003

131 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ec3bc05978451008bbd1ed651fe8c0be1c5b102f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Kannan Srinivasan
2. Baojun Jiang
3. Kinshuk Jerath

In Management of Technology and Innovation

1. Kannan Srinivasan
2. Baojun Jiang

In Marketing

1. Kannan Srinivasan
2. Dieter Ahlert
3. Baojun Jiang
4. Kinshuk Jerath
5. Michael P. Keane

Citations in the corpus

• Firm Strategies in the "Mid Tail" of Platform-Based Retailing (2011, background): “First, in most signaling games, a separating equilibrium in which a high-type player separates from a low-type player is the focal equilibrium (e.g., Desai 2000, Desai and 10   Srinivasan 1995, Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995, Shin 2005, Simester 1995, Soberman 2003).”
• The effects of country of origin and corporate reputation on initial trust: An experimental evaluation of the perception of Polish consumers (2008, background): “Signaling is important when one party is unfamiliar with the other party’s quality, and the quality cannot be observed prior to the exchange between the two parties (Soberman, 2003).”
• Signaling through Price and Quality to Consumers with Fairness Concerns (2016, unknown): “Our research also contributes to the signaling literature (e.g., Balachander 2001; Desai 2000; Desai and Srinivasan 1995; Jiang, Jerath, and Srinivasan 2011; Jiang et al. 2016; Moorthy and Srinivasan 1995; Shin 2005; Simester 1995; Soberman 2003).”