Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions
By Axel Dreher, Nathan M. Jensen. Journal law and economy, 2007
281 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Development, Finance, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e9ca075ea2047c2abe1322411a7dbf2ae998fade
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Development
- Axel Dreher
- J. Vreeland
- R. Stone
- Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Lindsay R. Dolan
- Richard Clark
- Christopher Kilby
- Peter Nunnenkamp
In Finance
- R. Stone
- Axel Dreher
- Christopher Kilby
- Jan-Egbert Sturm
- J. Vreeland
- Lindsay R. Dolan
- Richard Clark
- Diego F. Hernández
In Political Science and International Relations
- Christopher Kilby
- J. Vreeland
- Axel Dreher
- Diego F. Hernández
- Jan-Egbert Sturm
- L. King
- Thomas Stubbs
- A. Kentikelenis
Citations in the corpus
- Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending (2010, unknown): “…the financial and geopolitical interests of the United States (Thacker 1999; Stone 2002, 2004, 2008; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Broz and Hawes 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007), the structure of political institutions in borrower countries (Vreeland 2003, 2005), and ⁄or the IMF staff’s bureaucratic…”
- The Scope of IMF Conditionality (2008, background): “…of conditionality reported below, I include only observations that fall on test dates to avoid inflating the number of observations+ 37+ See Gould 2003; Dreher and Jensen 2007; and Copelovitch 2004+ 38+ Mussa and Savastano 1999+ The Scope of IMF Conditionality 599 D ow nl oa de d fr om h tt ps…”
- Politics and IMF Conditionality (2015, background): “10 See Ivanova et al. 2003, Gould 2003, Bulí ř and Moon 2004, Dreher and Jensen 2007, Dreher et al. 2009, Copelovitch 2010, Caraway et al. 2012.”
- Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation (2007, background): “However, various other studies suggest that multilateral institutions are not invulnerable to donor pressure (Weck-Hannemann and Schneider 1981; Frey and Schneider 1986; Dreher 2004; Fleck and Kilby 2006; Kilby 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2006; Dreher and Jensen 2007).”
- IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014 (2016, methodology): “…studies have shown the measure is a suitable proxy for the intrusiveness of conditionality (Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012; Copelovitch 2010; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; 2015), and it has been fruitfully employed in the IMF’s own studies (Bulir and Moon 2004;…”
- International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality (2012, background): “…is consistent with the previously observed and well-documented increase in the scope of IMF conditionality over time+89 87+ See Thacker 1999; and Dreher and Jensen 2007+ 88+ Of course, this assumes that the United States has an interest in promoting labor-related condi- tionality+ Whether…”
- Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council (2009, background): “Our data on the number of IMF conditions are from Dreher (2004), extended in Dreher and Jensen (2007).”
- Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank (2006, methodology): “Using data from Voeten (2004), I constructed a simple measure (UN alignment) following Thacker (1999) and Dreher and Jensen (2007) which ranges from 0 (always voting the opposite) to 1 (always voting the same).11 Kilby 12 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics.”
- IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, background): “Closer G7 allies receive fewer program conditions (Dreher and Jensen 2007) and larger loans (Oatley and Yackee 2004; Barro and Lee 2005).”
- Paying a visit: The Dalai Lama effect on international trade (2010, methodology): “…used measure for the extent of bilateral friendship is the degree to which countries vote in line with each other in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (e.g., Richardson and Kegley, 1980; Barro and Lee, 2005; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Dreher and Gassebner, 22 exp(−0.133) – 1 = −12.5%.”
- The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements (2009, background): “A number of researchers have explored the impact of donor interests on IFIs including the IMF (Andersen et al., 2006b; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Harrigan et al., 2006; Stone, 2002, 2004; Thacker, 1999; Vreeland, 2005), the World Bank (Andersen et al., 2006a; Fleck and Kilby, 2006; Frey and…”
- Are “New” Donors Challenging World Bank Conditionality? (2017, methodology): “This proxy has been repeatedly used in studies on conditionality.2 The dependent variable is 2 See for example Dreher and Jensen (2007) and Bresslein and Schmaljohann (2013). constructed using the Development Action Database from the World Bank, which contains information on all conditions…”
- Political Aid Cycles (2012, unknown): “3 Along with Kuziemko and Werker (2006) and Dreher and Jensen (2007) this paper provides evidence that politics plays a causal role.”