Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending

By Mark Copelovitch. 2010

324 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b7feb6275eef0f8278f82bd91202c3fce1a83ade

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Citations in the corpus

The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality (2016, background): “…costs of information and control, and the ability of agents to exploit preference heterogeneity among multiple and collective principals, there is substantial ‘agency slack’ in international organizations like the IMF (Copelovitch 2010; Hawkins et al. 2006; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Vaubel 2006).”
The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries (2014, background): “Some scholars construct multi-layered explanations, either by combining these two adjacent statecentric views (Oatley and Yackee 2004) or by factoring in moments of increased staff discretion (Copelovitch 2010).”
Politics and IMF Conditionality (2015, background): “10 See Ivanova et al. 2003, Gould 2003, Bulí ř and Moon 2004, Dreher and Jensen 2007, Dreher et al. 2009, Copelovitch 2010, Caraway et al. 2012.”
International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality (2012, background): “…the U+S+-Jordan Free Trade Act!+ However, these mechanisms do not impose restrictions on the forms of labor conditionality examined in this study+ 15+ See Copelovitch 2010a and 2010b+ 16+ Fang and Owen 2010+ 17+ Mukherjee and Singer 2010+ 18+ Ibid+, 58+ 19+ See Ivanova et al+ 2006; and Mayer…”
IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014 (2016, methodology): “Despite this, previous studies have shown the measure is a suitable proxy for the intrusiveness of conditionality (Caraway, Rickard, and Anner 2012; Copelovitch 2010; Dreher and Jensen 2007; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; 2015), and it has been fruitfully employed in the IMF’s own studies (Bulir…”
Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking (2020, methodology): “While conditionality has been studied extensively at the IMF (Dreher 2009b; Copelovitch 2010; Stone 2011), previous efforts for the World Bank have been necessarily indirect as a result of data limitations (Kilby 2009; Malik and Stone 2018).”
The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis (2016, background): “…crisis are treated equally and political factors – notably, the interests of the Fund’s large shareholders and the incentives of the IMF’s professional bureaucrats – play an important role in this context (e.g. Copelovitch, 2010a, 2010b; Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher & Vaubel, 2004; Thacker, 1999).”