The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements

By Christopher Kilby. 2009

256 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/089e12190c8b49a4f6d92c9b707ff36c580ac55e

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Development

1. Axel Dreher
2. J. Vreeland
3. Diego F. Hernández
4. Lindsay R. Dolan
5. Richard Clark
6. Michael J. Tierney
7. E. Werker
8. Stephan Klasen

In Information Systems

1. Axel Dreher
2. Lindsay R. Dolan
3. Richard Clark
4. J. Vreeland
5. Diego F. Hernández
6. Michael J. Tierney
7. Darren Hawkins
8. E. Werker

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Axel Dreher
2. Michael J. Tierney
3. J. Vreeland
4. Diego F. Hernández
5. Lindsay R. Dolan
6. Stephan Klasen
7. Richard Clark
8. E. Werker

Citations in the corpus

• Coding Error or Statistical Embellishment? The Political Economy of Reporting Climate Aid (2011, unknown): “…between multilateral donors’ policies and the interests of member governments (see e.g., Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009a; Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009b; Kilby, 2009, or the use of specific procedures and instruments of aid delivery, have also been assessed from a politico-economic perspective.”
• Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking (2020, background): “Like Kilby (2009), Malik and Stone (2018) look at the relationship between performance and disbursement of World Bank loans, although they use project-level performance reports rather than macroeconomic indicators.”
• Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011, unknown): “According to Killick (2006) and Vreeland (2006, 2007), noncompliance is not rigorously punished by the IMF.”
• The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective? (2013, background): “With specific reference toWorld Bank projects, Kilby ð2009Þ suggests that favoritism in project allocation undermines the credibility of conditionality, rendering it less effective.”
• Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance (2010, unknown): “3 In analyzing the characteristics of World Bank lending, this article is in the tradition of Andersen, Hansen, and Markussen (2006) and Kilby (2009).”
• More Dollars than Sense: Refining Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData (2011, background): “…a secondary consequence of, first using aid to cement alliances, bolster trade partnerships, or buy diplomatic cooperation in arenas like the United Nations (see Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Dreher, Sturm, & Vreeland, 2009; Kilby, 2009; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006; Stone, 2004; Stone, 2010; Vreeland, 2011).”
• Are “New” Donors Challenging World Bank Conditionality? (2017, background): “Kilby (2009) provides an insight as to why borrowers might not comply with World Bank conditions.”