Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council
By Axel Dreher, Jan-Egbert Sturm, J. Vreeland. 2009
403 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Information Systems
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a79df5708ddf3842c2e28fac5b30f4307a1a50d2
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Development
- Axel Dreher
- J. Vreeland
- Mark Copelovitch
- Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Andreas Fuchs
- Peter Nunnenkamp
- Hannes Öhler
- J. Frieden
In Economics and Econometrics
- Axel Dreher
- J. Vreeland
- Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Mark Copelovitch
- Peter Nunnenkamp
- Christoph Trebesch
- Hannes Öhler
- Stefanie Walter
In Information Systems
- Axel Dreher
- Peter Nunnenkamp
- Hannes Öhler
- Jan-Egbert Sturm
- Andreas Fuchs
- J. Vreeland
- Mark Copelovitch
- Carmen M. Reinhart
Citations in the corpus
- Politics and IMF Conditionality (2015, background): “Another study has shown that the IMF benefits of UNSC membership drop off when a term ends (for a clear presentation of the pattern, see Dreher et al. 2009, 747).”
- The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective? (2013, background): “Appendix C TABLE C1 SOURCES Variable Source UNSC approval time Dreher et al. ð2009bÞ UNSC project period Dreher et al. ð2009bÞ UNSC evaluation time Dreher et al. ð2009bÞ WBEB member at project evaluation Kaja and Werker ð2010Þ WBEB member at project period Kaja and Werker ð2010Þ WBEB member at…”
- The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis (2016, background): “…crisis are treated equally and political factors – notably, the interests of the Fund’s large shareholders and the incentives of the IMF’s professional bureaucrats – play an important role in this context (e.g. Copelovitch, 2010a, 2010b; Dreher et al., 2009; Dreher & Vaubel, 2004; Thacker, 1999).”
- Rogue Aid? The Determinants of China's Aid Allocation (2011, background): “…on the allocation of aid by traditional donors exists, which emphasizes that aid is frequently given for political reasons rather than economic needs (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Neumayer 2005; Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher et al. 2009a, 2009b; Kilby 2009, 2011; Reynaud and Vauday 2009).”
- IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, positive): “According to Dreher et al. (2009), temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive IMF programs with fewer conditions, arguably because they are more important for the Fund’s major shareholders.”
- The International Monetary Fund: 70 Years of Reinvention (2015, background): “Dreher et al. (2009), for instance, 14 “Re-globalization” refers to the fact that the integration of capital markets was substantial in the heyday of the gold standard era (Eichengreen 1992; Obstfeld and Taylor 2004; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009) before two World Wars with the global economic…”
- Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011, positive): “Stone (2008) and Dreher et al. (2009) report similar results for IMF conditionality.”