The Scope of IMF Conditionality

By R. Stone. International Organization, 2008

385 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6e9efd8996913988fe30b4d21811637458d8e5b8

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Citations in the corpus

The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality (2016, background): “The delegates of these governments have the largest formal voting power in the Executive Board, but even beyond formal votes they have a considerable impact on IMF policies through so-called “informal governance” (Stone 2008).”
The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence (2008, methodology): “In contrast, Stone (2008) finds that while countries apparently desire to minimize conditionality, the Fund often refrains from imposing maximum conditionality when it is in a strong bargaining position.”
The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries (2014, background): “…be a factor or not, but U.S. (geo-)political and economic interests—with support from private actors (Broz and Hawes 2006)—figure among the common explanations for the thrust of lending policies, as well as its occasional deviations (Momani 2004; Stone 2008; Thacker 1999; Wade and Veneroso 1998).”
IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014 (2016, background): “To do so, we build on a growing literature (Dreher et al. 2015; IEO 2007a; 2007b; Stone 2008), and examine the ‘scope’ of IMF conditionality: how many policy areas are subject to reform in IMF programmes? Such metrics speak directly to issues of mission creep examined above, as critics argue that IM”
Does Conditionality Work? A Test for an Innovative US Aid Scheme (2011, neutral): “Our focus on corruption alone implies that our approach is rather modest in comparison with that of Johnson and Zajonc (2006) who consider all eligibility criteria, even though we do take into account that the incentives for candidate countries to fight corruption may depend on how they score on…”
The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically Driven Aid Less Effective? (2013, background): “We conclude that the interaction of “vulnerability” and political importance does not matter for project numbers, and therefore the mechanism suggested in Stone ð2008Þ for the IMF does not drive our results for the World Bank.”
IMF conditionality: theory and evidence (2008, neutral): “40For a detailed summary, see Haque and Khan (1998), Bird (2001) or Steinwand and Stone (2008).”
Politics and IMF Conditionality (2015, background): “The scope of conditionality: Measuring the scope of conditionality is a relatively new approach, suggested by Stone (2008).”
Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking (2020, methodology): “Following Stone (2008), we also calculate the number of categories that prior actions span for a given project.17 As a further step, we use the text of the conditions themselves, examining the distribution of words that frequently appear.”
“The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over IMF lending (2012, methodology): “Following the convention in the literature (Broz and Hawes 2006; Stone 2008; 2011), I proxy this influence using country lending exposure by U.”
D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation (2009, background): “…or donors, possibly even created specially to dispense false legitimacy to counter the criticisms of other monitors+ 63+ Alesina and Dollar 2000+ 64+ Stone 2008+ reports that chronicle serious irregularities, but then praise the progress and endorse the outcome+ Russia in the mid- to late-1990s…”
International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality (2012, background): “…each year+ Higher values indicate greater correspondence between a country’s UN voting record and the voting record of the United States+ 74+ Steinwand and Stone 2008, 136, tab+ 4+ 75+ Ibid+ 76+ See, for example, the IMF’s staff report for Ireland+Available at ^http:00www+imf+org0external0…”