Agency, simulation and self-identification

By Marc Jeannerod, Elisabeth Pacherie. 2004

207 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e97b9670afe61a677bc43414390d07bdaf8d17c2

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Citations in the corpus

Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors (2008, background): “Also, because mirror neurons are activated both when I act and when I see someone else act, they are said to be neutral with respect to who the agent is (see Gallese 2005; Hurley 2005; Jeannerod and Pacherie 2004).”
Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory (2007, background): “First, we perceive the other’s behavior; this is followed immediately by activation of shared representations – in neutral mode (registering “naked intentions”); and this is followed by a determination of the agent, i.e., a specification of who did the action – me or the other person ( Jeannerod and”
The sense of self in the phenomenology of agency and perception (2007, background): “Moreover, the need to distinguish one’s own observed movement from other’s movement is complicated by the fact that own and other’s movements enjoy partially shared representations primarily in the motor system (Blakemore and Frith 2003; Jeannerod and Pacherie 2004).”
Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition (2008, background): “…2003; Jeannerod, 2001; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Matelli, et al., 1996), although these phenomena would not have led Merleau-Ponty in the direction of simulation theory, as we find in many authors (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004).”
Multiple aspects in the sense of agency (2012, background): “…is one of I-am-opening-the-door, and clearcut distinctions between agency and action come up only on the occasion of reflecting on the event.12 12 Jeannerod and Pacherie (2004) claim that “it is like this with the perception of intention: when Mary watches John open the door, she is primarily…”
Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal (2011, background): “[… ]W e […] believe that simulation is the root form of interpersonal mentalization and that it is best conceived as a hybrid of explicit and implicit processes, with subpersonal neural simulation serving as a basis for explicit mental simulation ( Jeannerod and Pacherie 2004, 128–129).”
The Phenomenology of Joint Action: Self-Agency vs. Joint-Agency (2012, background): “parietal cortex and the insula are strongly implicated in this process of self–other distinction (Ruby & Decety, 2001; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer et al., 2003; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004).”
Towards a dynamic theory of intentions (2009, background): “9 For further discussion of these issues, see Jeannerod & Pacherie (2004).”
The body in action (2008, background): “15 I agree with Jeannerod and Pacherie (2004) that ordinarily problems of action-attribution or ownership”
Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency. (2008, unknown): “Thus, the SoA is a dialectic combination of both bottom–up processes (as emphasized by Frith, 2005; Gallagher, 2007; Jeannerod & Pacherie, 2004) and top–down processes (as emphasized by Stephens & Graham, 2000).”
Mental imagery of speech: linking motor and perceptual systems through internal simulation and estimation (2012, methodology): “AUDITORY HALLUCINATIONS: INTACT ESTIMATION VERSUS BROKEN MONITORING Internal simulation and sequential estimation has been proposed to be a way to distinguish between the perceptual changes caused by self-generated actions and exogenous external events (Blakemore and Frith, 2003; Jeannerod and Pache”