Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency.
By Matthis Synofzik, Gottfried Vosgerau, Albert Newen. Consciousness and Cognition, 2008
949 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Psychiatry and Mental health, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7c74b0d39a8b40e9037f4e968773d9b5dbee3366
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Manos Tsakiris
- H. Ehrsson
- Andreas Kalckert
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- Micah G. Allen
- Mel Slater
- T. Buhrmann
- Patrick Haggard
In Psychiatry and Mental health
- H. Ehrsson
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- Andreas Kalckert
- Manos Tsakiris
- Patrick Haggard
- E. D. Di Paolo
- Karl J. Friston
- Micah G. Allen
In Philosophy
- H. Ehrsson
- Patrick Haggard
- E. D. Di Paolo
- Karl J. Friston
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- Andreas Kalckert
- Manos Tsakiris
- Micah G. Allen
Citations in the corpus
- The Experience of Agency (2009, background): “Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) drew an important distinction between the judgment of agency (JoA) and the feeling of agency (FoA).”
- The sense of agency – a phenomenological consequence of enacting sensorimotor schemes (2017, methodology): “Synofzik et al. (2007) present a range of arguments to this effect.”
- Moving a Rubber Hand that Feels Like Your Own: A Dissociation of Ownership and Agency (2012, positive): “( complex structure, with multiple levels, presumably involving different processes (for further discussion, see Haggard et al., 2002; Jeannerod, 2003; David et al., 2008; Synofzik et al., 2008a,b).”
- How does it feel to act together? (2014, background): “One way to try and combine the two approaches is to appeal to the distinction between prereflective experiences or feelings of agency and reflective judgments of agency proposed by several authors (Bayne & Pacherie, 2007; Gallagher, 2007; Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008)…”
- From cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind (2016, background): “…of agency was hypothesized to depend upon the integration of motor feedback and intentional goals; experimentally, this corresponds to a hypothetical factorial interaction between these sub-components, and these can be experimentally manipulated independently of one another (Synofzik et al. 2008).”