Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory
By Shaun Gallagher. 2007
53 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bb91228f8b24555833150f661a4c84392536eeaf
How researchers see this paper
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Shaun Gallagher
- Hanne De Jaegher
- E. D. Di Paolo
- Pierre Jacob
- Thomas Fuchs
- Tom Froese
- T. Buhrmann
- Xabier E. Barandiaran
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
In History and Philosophy of Science
Citations in the corpus
- What Do Mirror Neurons Contribute to Human Social Cognition (2008, background): “However, as noticed by Gallagher (2007) and recognized by Goldman (2006) , there are at least two relevant differences between mirroring as exemplifi ed by MNs and either intrapersonal or interpersonal pretence.”
- Participatory sense-making (2007, background): “Although several researchers have already started to regard problems in social cognition from embodied perspectives ( Gallagher 2001, 2005, 2007; Hutto 2004; Klin et al. 2003; Thompson 2001), one motivation for our proposal is the observation that they have not yet gone far enough in taking the int”
- Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition (2008, background): “See also Anderson (2003); Brooks (1999); Clancey (1997); Hutto (in press); Kirsh (2004); Noë (2004), Rowlands (2007), and the special issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (vol. 1, no. 4, 2002) on Dreyfus’s anti-representationalism. image of a slab; the slab is perceptually and handily a”
- Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors (2008, background): “…neuronal processes that include activation of mirror neurons or shared representations constitute the neural correlates of a non-articulated immediate perception of the other person’s intentional actions, rather than a distinct process of simulating their intentions (Gallagher 2007a, in press).”